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 1 
Introduction  
Since the attacks of September 11th, 2001, when hijackers piloted American 
passenger planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, terrorism has become the 
largest security concern of the United States. Also, religious terrorist groups are distinct in 
that they launch much more violent and costly attacks than other kinds of terrorists, 
leading to nation states making combating terrorism a much higher national security 
priority. The hijackers from 9/11 were mostly from Saudi Arabia, along with a few from 
other Arab states, who were all members of the terrorist organization al Qaeda, led by 
Osama Bin Laden. Al Qaeda attacked the United States because it viewed U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East as destructive to Muslims and wanted to get rid of foreign influence in 
Muslim countries. Osama Bin Laden described al Qaeda’s religious reasoning for attacking 
the U.S stating: 
 “We have declared jihad against the US, because in our religion it is our duty 
to make jihad so that God's word is the one exalted to the heights and so that 
we drive the Americans away from all Muslim countries”1. 
 
The attacks on 9/11 led to President George W. Bush’s declaration of the 
commencement of The War on Terror in which he stated, “Our ‘War on Terror’ begins with 
al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach 
has been found, stopped, and defeated.2" George W. Bush believed that the only way to 
combat terrorism was to destroy all terrorist organizations, starting with al-Qaeda and 
continuing on to other groups throughout the world. President Bush’s speech about the 
                                                 
1 Laden to Frontline newsgroup, "Osama bin Laden V. The U.S: Edicts and Statements." 
2 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People: Hearings Before the American 
People, 2001 President (D.C. 2001) (statement of George W. Bush). Accessed May 1, 2017. 
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html. 
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events of 9/11 and the War on Terror rallied U.S public opinion in support of the war. The 
War on Terror led the United States to invade both Afghanistan and Iraq. After fifteen 
years, U.S troops are still battling terrorists in Afghanistan, and despite the U.S. withdrawal 
of conventional soldiers from Iraq, the state is still in major turmoil due to terrorist 
organizations. The U.S., along with its allies, has failed to destroy al-Qaeda and global 
terrorism through military means, and now the terrorist group The Islamic State is 
operating in Iraq and Syria.  
  While the United States continues to prosecute the war on terrorism, history 
suggests most terrorist groups will eventually collapse on their own without states’ 
counter terrorism measures. The majority of terrorist groups struggle to survive and 
eventually collapse within several years.  It has been estimated that around 70% of modern 
terrorist groups do not continue to exist past one year from their first attack, and 80% do 
not exist five years after their first attack.3 However, there is a reason to expect that 
religiously motivated terrorist organizations are capable of having a much longer life span 
compared to other forms of terrorism. 
For example, consider the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The IRA formed in 1917 and 
has, until recently, continued to operate and launch attacks. The IRA, originally formed to 
end the British rule of Ireland, later fought to unify Northern Ireland with the independent 
Republic of Ireland after Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland were split. Danny 
Morrison, a former IRA member, explains why the IRA resorted to violence for Irish 
independence stating, “The main struggle, the main thrust- and this goes without saying- is 
                                                 
3 Young and Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest,". 
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the armed struggle, because that’s the only way to get the Brits out of Ireland”4. The IRA 
has survived longer than other anticolonial terrorist group and even any other modern 
terrorist group5. In addition, the IRA was also a religious organization. Despite the IRA 
having nonreligious goals, it was by no means a secular organization. The IRA was not a 
secular organization because it was deeply connected to Catholicism due to the sectarian 
divide between Irish and English Protestants vs. Irish Catholics. These observations raise 
important questions: why do religious terrorist organizations6 last longer than other kinds 
of terrorist groups? And what consequences does this have for U.S foreign policy?  
I contend that religion changes the recruitment strategies of terrorist organizations, 
enabling them to continue to recruit new members because the religious ideology of the 
organization can draw them in. Religion allows terrorists to recruit new members not just 
for political reasons but for religious reasons as well. The very nature of religious terrorist 
groups helps draw in additional recruits, because joining the groups seems more 
imperative and morally justified because they are fighting for their religious beliefs and 
their God or God’s. Religion also attracts new members because terrorist organizations can 
frame political issues and counterterrorism measures as an attack on their religion, which 
makes people believe they must join in order to defend their religious beliefs. Many of 
these groups that are recognized as religion-based organizations are hardly that at all, but 
the religious aspects are highlighted in order to gain sympathy and inspire new 
                                                 
4 Shanahan, Provisional Irish, [Page 45]. 
5 Rapoport, Attacking Terrorism, [Page 48]. 
6 To be clear, when I use the term religious terrorist organization, I do not mean to suggest that 
terrorism grows out of any specific religion. This is a particularly important point given the current 
politicization of Islamic terrorism in the United States national security discourse. Thus when I use 
the terms Islamic terrorist organization or Islamic terrorist. I am referring to their self-described 
religious motivation, and not making a judgment to the legitimacy of those claims. 
 4 
membership. In predicting the longevity of a terrorist group, it is essential to look at their 
recruitment strategies and their recruitment successes. Many religious terrorist groups 
have excelled in continuously recruiting newer members, and because of this it appears 
they will continue to exist as long as their recruitment strategies are not interrupted. 
In this paper, I will first review why recruitment is vital for terrorist groups, because 
successful recruitment leads to the longevity of these organizations especially because it is 
difficult for terrorist groups to survive. From there I am going to write about my case study 
of the IRA and how religion was important for IRA recruitment. Successful recruiting based 
on religious beliefs allowed the IRA to become the longest lasting modern terrorist 
organization. In the following section, I am going to write about two currently operating 
Islamic terrorists groups, al Qaeda and ISIS, who despite using varying methods of 
recruitment, still both utilize religion to gain members. Finally, I consider the implications 
of this argument for current U.S. counterterrorism policy.  
 
 5 
Why Recruitment is Important for Longevity  
The reason why certain terrorist groups survive longer than others is due to their 
ability to continuously appeal to individuals to join their organization. Constant 
recruitment is necessary for terrorist organizations because it provides these groups with 
the manpower and resources needed to continue their campaign. Brian Phillips describes 
why terrorist organizations are dependent on recruitment for survival writing, 
 “Groups want sympathetic individuals to join them in the struggle, but costs 
to the individuals—prison or death, for example—can be high. To survive, 
terrorist groups need to have attributes that give them advantages in 
mobilization. Mobilization refers to the process of a group maintaining its 
resources (members, money, etc.) and getting new resources.”7 
As previously mentioned, 80% of modern terrorist organizations do not continue to 
operate for more than five years after their first attack, as seen in the graph below8. The 
majority of groups that do not survive past the five-year mark do so because of their 
inability to recruit new members and maintain enough members for the organization to 
function. Terrorist groups with greater membership are more durable and can continue to 
operate longer because they have more resources through their members, therefore 
making it much more difficult for governments to break them apart9.  Lack of constant 
recruitment is what leads to the demise of most terrorist organizations. 
                                                 
7 Phillips, "Terrorist Group," [Page 337]. 
8 Young and Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest," 
9 Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist," [Page 17]. 
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Figure 1. Kaplan-Meier function for 2,223 terrorist organizations, 1970-2010 10 
Terrorist groups also acknowledge the strength of their membership as well as the 
importance of recruitment as being vital to their survivability. This can explain why 
terrorist organizations are constantly competing with one another for members.  Terrorist 
groups have to capture the interest of recruits in order for the recruits to join their 
organization and not another. In doing so they advertise their brand of terrorism as if they 
were a company advertising a product. When a terrorist group successfully creates an 
ideology and follows certain practices that are popular among possible recruits, then it can 
succeed in gaining more members giving the group the longevity it desires. Groups that are 
unable to compete with other groups for membership are much more likely to fade away. 
The necessity for recruits and competition among terrorist groups becomes even more 
                                                 
10 Young and Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest," 
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evident when you look at how the number of terrorist attacks and the number of groups 
currently operating within one region correlate, which is due to these terrorist groups 
launching attacks in order to gain notoriety and members11. In the graph below, one can 
see how the number of competing terrorist groups led to the increase in terrorist attacks, 
which were in large part executed by each group in order to draw in new members to their 
organizations.  
 
Figure 2.  Number of Terror Attacks and Groups from 1970 to 2010, Global Terrorism 
Database12 
 
Recruitment is essential to terrorist organizations if they are to survive and have a 
chance at succeeding or achieving some of their political goals. However, even for the 20% 
of terrorists groups that manage to successfully recruit enough members to survive for five 
years, they do not usually exist longer than one generation.  The reason why terrorist 
                                                 
11 Young and Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest," 
12 Young and Dugan, "Survival of the Fittest," 
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organizations only last about one generation at most is because of their inability to 
successfully continue their recruitment strategies beyond one generation. As hard as it is 
for terrorist groups to recruit enough members to begin their organization, it becomes 
even more troublesome when it comes to recruiting a newer, younger generation. Once a 
group becomes older, it becomes much harder for members to appeal to younger 
generations who are more likely to be out of touch with the group’s cause. The younger 
generation of potential recruits may relate more to a new cause and be drawn to different 
ideas proposed by a newer terrorist group’s ideology.  
This pattern is consistent with the wave theory of terrorism, which purports to 
explain why each “breed” of terrorist group has lasted about one generation. David 
Rapoport describes how forms of terrorism have gradually disappeared writing, “ When a 
waves energy cannot inspire new organizations, the wave disappears. Resistance, political 
concessions, and change in perceptions of generations are critical factors in explaining the 
disappearance”13. As terrorist groups become older, it becomes much more difficult to gain 
new membership from younger generations because they do no share the same views or 
values as the original members of the organization. Once a terrorist organization is unable 
to appeal to younger recruits, the terrorist group eventually dies out along with its aging 
members.  Currently, the most common form of terrorism is religious terrorism, which 
started to become popular in the 1970s. Religious terrorism has now existed for 46 years, 
thus, according to the David Rapoport’s wave theory; the United States should expect al-
Qaeda, its affiliates, and other religious terrorist groups to persist for about ten more years 
                                                 
13 Rapoport, The Four, [Page 48]. 
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until a generational shift in ideas makes it impossible for existing religious terrorists 
groups to successfully recruit new members. According to the wave theory, younger 
generations will be disinterested with the ideas of religious terrorism and will join newer 
“breeds” of terrorism creating a new wave of modern terrorism.  
Due to religious terrorist groups uniqueness in their use of religiosity to mobilize 
more members to fight, they can survive for much longer than other kinds of groups. 
Generational shifts in political views of younger members have led to the demise of many 
terrorist groups, but many believe that these organizations may survive because of the 
“staying power of sacred or spiritually based motivation”14 which helps attract new 
members from younger generations. Scholars use the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as a 
prime example of how to gain new members by using religion as a motivating factor.  
 
 
  
                                                 
14 Jones and Libicki, "How Terrorist," [Page 6]. 
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Case Study of the IRA 
 The Irish Republican Army provides a valuable case study for evaluating the 
longevity of terrorist organizations because of the IRA’s uniqueness in existing for such an 
extended period of time. The Irish Republican Army was formed in the early 1900’s as a 
nationalist group that fought for Irish independence from England. So you may wonder, 
how does the nationalist IRA relate to today’s religious terrorist groups? Despite the 
conflict in Ireland revolving around Irish independence, religion played a major role in the 
conflict. The IRA’s fight for Irish independence developed into a fight between Catholics 
and Protestants. In the following chapter, I describe many important moments that 
occurred in the IRA’s history and how religion played a pivotal role.  Religion affected 
recruiting and is the reason why the IRA existed for such a long stretch of time in 
comparison to most other terrorist groups.  
Background: 
Before the IRA became organized, it was inevitable that a religious conflict would 
occur as a result of the political environment in Ireland. Prior to the formation of the IRA, 
there was already a major division in Ireland between Catholics and Protestants. Ireland 
was predominantly Irish Catholic, but Protestants made up a majority of Ireland’s six 
northern counties, while Catholics held a majority population in the remaining twenty-six 
counties. However, because Ireland was part of the United Kingdom, Irish Catholics were 
treated as British citizens. Unlike Ireland, Britain’s population had a Protestant majority, 
which led to Irish Protestants being treated much better than Irish Catholics.  Religious, 
economic, and land ownership issues in Ireland led to the Irish Home Rule Movement in the 
1870’s which was a push for the development of an Irish parliament that would rule over 
 11 
domestic issues in Ireland. The Irish Home Rule Movement started to gain more 
momentum once Irish Protestants began to agree that union with Great Britain was 
becoming more problematic, and Britain’s government did not have the capability of fixing 
many of Ireland’s problems. Isaac Butt, who developed the first Home Rule Act, made it 
clear that if the Protestants supported the home rule movement, then they would gain 
support from the Catholic majority who he and many others believed would spiral into 
rebellion if an Irish Parliament was not developed15.  Unionists did not want to separate 
from Britain, but they accepted that the Irish Catholics would likely rise up if something 
was not done to give Ireland more independence.  
It wasn’t until 1914 that the Third Irish Home Bill passed in England and was 
expected to go into effect after one year or until the end of WWI. Irish Catholics, who 
largely favored the bill, were anticipating having self-governance, which would give them 
more power and make their own culture more prominent16.  The development of the Home 
Rule Bill was met with severe resistance from unionists. Unionists formed the Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF) that promised to use military force in order to protect unionist 
politics. Witnessing unionists bearing arms in opposition to the Home Rule Act, nationalists 
responded with a similar gesture in the Home Rule’s defense.  “Thus in November 1913 in 
Dublin the Irish Volunteers established, a militia whose Irish title was to be that of the IRA 
into which the volunteers later evolved”17. Due to the formation of armed unionists, 
nationalists responded by developing their own militia, which would later develop into the 
well-known IRA .The religious divide became more apparent among Protestants and 
                                                 
15 McCaffery, "Isaac Butt," [Page 78]. 
16 English, Armed Struggle, [Page 10]. 
17 English, Armed Struggle, [Page 10]. 
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Catholics because of politics with Protestants resisting the Home Rule Act and Catholics 
strongly supporting the act. Eventually, war broke out between the Irish nationalists and 
British called the Anglo-Irish War. The war would result in the Anglo-Irish treaty which 
created an independent Ireland which consisted of all majority Catholic counties and 
Northern Ireland which was mostly Protestant and would remain under British control. 
The war and its aftermath would only intensify the religious divide between Protestants 
and Catholics and help the IRA continuously recruit new members. The political views of 
Irish Catholics and Protestants were for the most part polar opposites because Catholics 
supported Irish nationalism and while Protestants supported maintaining Ireland’s union 
with England. This political divide between nationalists and unionists throughout the 
1900’s would not just lead to a political conflict between unionists and nationalists, but a 
religious conflict as well because of how Protestants and Catholics had such divided 
political beliefs regarding England. The political struggle between both sides would become 
a religious struggle as well, and would help the IRA gain members as religious differences 
between unionists and nationalists became a major factor influencing Irish Catholics to join 
the IRA.  
 
Easter Rising 
The Irish nationalist movement began to gain even more momentum on April 24th, 
1917 it was Easter and a rebellion started in Dublin that lasted several days. The Irish 
Republican Brotherhood and another group called the Irish Volunteers organized and 
launched the rebellion and claimed the land they controlled to be ruled under the Irish 
Republic, free from British rule. The Easter Rising only lasted five days until the British 
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army had destroyed the rebellion and restored English control. Despite the uprising’s 
defeat, it did succeed in changing Ireland’s political atmosphere. After the uprising was 
crushed, British troops executed all of the leaders who organized the plot and imprisoned 
many other nationalist participants. The British army also destroyed many homes and 
businesses in Dublin after the rising. The British army’s punishment of those active in the 
rebellion and destruction of private property in Dublin were done in the hope that it would 
create fear among Irish nationalists and deter any further rebellion. However, the British 
army’s actions had an adverse effect and actually promoted nationalist sentiment among 
Irish Catholics. “Together with the post-Rising arrest and internment of many people, the 
executions produced sympathy for that rebel cause which they were supposed to 
undermine. The dead rebels became martyrs... A cult had come into existence, with a quasi-
sacred quality attaching itself to the rebel leaders after the Rising had entered popular 
imagination. Catholic Ireland had found new heroes, and their celebration-unsurprisingly- 
possessed a markedly religious flavor”18 After the Easter Rising those who took part 
succeeded in spreading their vision of a sovereign Ireland to the Irish Catholic population. 
The Easter Rising proved to be the spark that ignited Irish Catholics to pursue the 
development of a free Irish state.  
While the Easter rising occurred before the founding of the IRA, it proved to be an 
essential event that led to the creation of the IRA and helped maintain its recruiting for a 
long period of time. Before the Easter Rising, Irish nationalists relied on diplomatic 
methods to gain varying forms of independence from England. Despite diplomatic means 
                                                 
18 English, Armed Struggle, [Page 6]. 
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being successful in leading to the approval of the Thirds Home Rule Act giving Ireland only 
domestic power, many British politicians and Irish unionists strongly opposed the 
implementation and many militaristic unionists groups formed. They included both the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Volunteers. Both of these groups were hardline 
nationalist groups who believed that in order to create a better Ireland an independent 
Irish state was vital, and the use of violence was justified in order to achieve this goal. 
However, before the Easter Rising many Irish nationalists did not share this view and many 
of these groups were small and without much influence. Nevertheless, due to the Easter 
Rising and its aftermath, many Irish nationalists and Catholics began to believe that an 
Independent Irish state was needed and that diplomatic methods would potentially not be 
useful without violent actions. The sentiment that developed among many Irish nationalists 
and Catholics that violence was necessary, helped spur the formation and successful 
recruitment of the IRA because it created a large population of Irish nationalists and 
Catholics who would be potential recruits for the IRA.  
With the Easter Rising changing the public’s perspective of Ireland’s relationship 
with Britain, existing nationalist groups also changed. Before the Easter Rising, many 
nationalistic groups existed although none had a large amount of members or carried out a 
significant amount of civil unrest. After the rising, more Irish citizens began to join 
nationalist groups to fight for Irish independence, but no groups changed as much as the 
Volunteers. The Easter Rising changed everything for the Volunteers as older members left 
and waves of new ambitious and energetic recruits joined the group filling old units and 
creating numerous new units and becoming unofficially known as the IRA19.  Many 
                                                 
19 Hart, "The Social," [Page 219]. 
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nationalist groups in Ireland faded away as the IRA gained thousands of members and 
became even more powerful. The IRA eventually became the military power of the newly 
formed Irish Parliament and was the main fighting force against the British in the Anglo-
Irish war. With the IRA becoming the most powerful nationalist group, it became even 
easier for the organization to recruit because recruits saw the IRA as being more promising 
in creating an Irish state. 
The Easter Rising proved to be a pivotal and critical moment for the IRA because it 
led to the group’s creation and large-scale recruitment.  Due to Irish Catholic and 
nationalist’s very sympathetic views of the Easter Rising, many became more inclined to 
join the IRA and fight the British instead of relying solely on diplomatic means20. 
Eventually, the Anglo-Irish war ended in 1921 with the Anglo-Irish peace treaty signed 
creating an independent Ireland with 26 counties and Northern Ireland with 6 counties 
under British control which all had a Protestant a majority population. At the height of the 
war there were believed to be about 100,000 members, but once the treaty was signed the 
IRA was split on whether to accept the treaty or not and continue fighting. This divide 
resulted in 90% percent of the IRA’s members leaving, choosing to accept the treaty while 
the remaining members still believed that Northern Ireland should be incorporated into 
the Republic of Ireland21. However, despite the IRA losing so many members the group 
survived and eventually grew again due to the division of Ireland and Northern Ireland 
being created based on sectarian lines, which created new issues and conflicts. For 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 
20 English, Armed Struggle, [Page 10]. 
21 Hart, "The Social," [Page 209]. 
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generations to come, Irish nationalists and Catholics were inspired to fight against the 
British until they believed they had succeeded in uniting all of Ireland under one Irish 
Republic.  
The Troubles 
The division of Northern Ireland and Ireland had been an issue since the Anglo-Irish 
treaty was signed, however, it would become even more problematic during the late 1960s 
and would help the IRA have a resurgence recruitment and strength. The minority 
population of Catholics in Northern Ireland were viewed and treated as second class 
citizens, and as Northern Irish Catholics began to clash with Protestants, North Ireland 
Police, and British military forces, things quickly become much more violent in Northern 
Ireland with smaller incidents happening in the Republic of Ireland and Britain. The uptick 
in violence in the region is referred to as the Troubles Period because of the surge in 
political violence that lasted from 1969 until the mid-1990s. Due to the political and 
religious conflicts during the Troubles Period, the IRA experienced a surge in recruiting 
between 1969 and the early 1970s and that helped lead to continued recruiting success for 
decades and the group’s longevity. In the following section, I will explain events that 
occurred during the Troubles Period and how they led to the IRA gaining and new recruits 
and maintaining their influence in the region. 
 
Battle Of Bogside 
During the 1960’s, Bogside, a Catholic area in Derry, Northern Ireland was the home 
of many civil rights demonstrations that protested for equal rights for Catholics primarily 
in the areas of employment and political disfranchisement. However, no demonstration 
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would have more of an effect than during annual parade called the Apprentice Boy Parade 
in 1969. The parade celebrates the failed revolt of Catholic James II to Protestant William of 
Orange who held the British throne. The parade had taken place for years and was meant to 
humiliate Catholics and many indeed felt threatened by it. However, in 1969 as the parade 
went past the Catholic community in Bogside, conflict erupted. A riot occurred once 
Catholics began to protest the Parade as it traveled past Bogside, which was predominantly 
Catholic. Fighting took place between Catholics on one side and Royal Ulster Constabulary 
(Northern Ireland’s police force) and unionist Protestants on the other.  The British army 
was then deployed in order to stop the violence, eventually ending the Battle of Bogside 
and resulting in great suffering within the Catholic community. “British forces were 
dispatched on August 14th to help deescalate the situation. Despite their presence, violence 
against the Catholic community continued: Loyalist Protestant mobs burnt down homes 
and schools and murdered community members, while, in some instances, Northern Irish 
authorities sat idly by observing the devastation and carnage”22. Despite the British army’s 
presence, loyalist Protestants continued to attack the Catholic community and in some 
instances in front of Northern Irish police who did nothing to stop the violence.  
Due to Catholics being a minority in Northern Ireland, they were much more 
vulnerable to violence because they were such a smaller population making them an easy 
target for Protestants. Catholics were treated as second-class citizens in Northern Ireland, 
which is why the Battle of Bogside occurred in the first place. The battle proved to many 
Catholics that in order to protect themselves and end the discrimination they endured, they 
                                                 
22 Michael Arena and Bruce Arrigo, The Provisional Irish Republican Army (New York, NY: NYU 
Press, 2007),  
 
 18 
must take matters into their own hands because clearly the Northern Irish government and 
its institutions did not regard Catholics as equals for if they had they would have 
intervened and protected them.  
The Battle of Bogside became a rallying call to Irish Catholics in both the Republic of 
Ireland and Northern Ireland to fight back against Britain and loyalists because the 
Catholics believed, and for good reason, that Catholics living in Northern Ireland were in 
danger and England and political elites in Northern Ireland did not have any regard for the 
minority population of Catholics. The IRA greatly benefited from the Battle of Bogside 
because it caused numerous Catholics to join because many viewed the IRA as a necessity 
to defend their communities.   
Lorenzo Bosi conducted interviews of previous IRA members about why they 
originally joined the IRA and quoted one former member who stated how the treatment of 
Catholics in his community and himself by the British army and Protestants effected his 
decision to join the IRA: 
“In 1969 the Troubles broke out. I witnessed the burnings and some of the 
shootings. I also witnessed the death of a school friend. Shortly after that I 
was arrested for rioting behavior, and I was sentenced to two months in 
prison. While I was in prison I met some people who were both members of 
the Provisional IRA and of the Official IRA. While their influence was really 
strong… they probably just stoked awareness then for the first time. It was 
the first recollection of anything political. Before, during the very early stages 
of the Troubles, I wouldn’t have known what was going on, the political 
issues and colonization and all that, never gave [it] a thought a thought 
before. And it [wa]s then, when I come out of the prison, late in 1971, that I 
made my own choice to join the IRA; I decided to join the IRA to be able to 
fight back at the British. I still did not understand the politics of Ireland… I 
probably made my own conclusions very, very quickly, and I just made a 
decision to join the IRA. With a sense of being able to strike back with any 
sense of meaning at the British, at unionism. Not that I fully understood then, 
but I just felt what was done towards us was wrong and that someone had to 
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do something, and that is what it was that motivated me; a very, very simple 
choice. (Interview no.4)23 
 
Many members joined the IRA for similar reasons as the person in Bosi’s fourth 
interview. Those who joined during in the late 1960’s and 1970’s had fewer political 
reasons to become involved than previous members had. The IRA gained a large amount of 
members who did not fully subscribe to the IRA’s nationalistic goals at the time they joined 
because the majority was more interested in fighting the British and Protestants because of 
the discrimination Irish Catholics were facing in Northern Ireland. The IRA provided an 
avenue for Catholics who felt it was their responsibility to fight the British and Northern 
Irish loyalists in order to create a state that protected Catholics.  The individual in Bosi’s 
fourth interview admitted to only knowing very little about the politics revolving around 
Irish nationalism but due to their attraction to the IRA they soon adopted the group’s 
ideology of uniting Ireland with Northern Ireland under the Republic of Ireland. 
 By looking at a graph below, it shows how Catholics in Northern Ireland were 
subject to much more violence than Protestants during the Troubles.  
                                                 
23 Bosi, "Explaining Pathways," [Page 371]. 
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 Sources: Irish Social Mobility Survey, 1973; Social Attitudes Survey, 1978; Social Identity 
Survey, 1995; Northern Ireland Referendum and Election Survey, 1998. 24 
This graph clearly shows the difference in the ways that Catholics and Protestants 
experience violence in Northern Ireland. Catholics in Northern Ireland are more likely to be 
intimidated by violence, witnessing violence, knowing someone who has been killed or 
injured, and being a victim of violence themselves25. Hayes and McAlister wrote about the 
differing views Protestants and Catholics and had towards the legitimacy of violence going 
on during the Troubles based on a survey conducted in 1973, shortly after the Troubles 
started: 
“A more explicit question about the legitimacy of violence, divorced from 
historical circumstances, produced different results in 1973. When asked if 
they believed that violence was a legitimate way to achieve one’s goals, 16 
percent of Protestants agreed, but more significantly, 25 percent of Catholics 
took the same view. Clearly the violence of the early years of the conflict, 
which had disproportionately affected Catholic areas, had caused a shift in 
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opinion towards support for the use of violence in order to defend their areas 
from Protestant attack.”26 
 
The increased violence led to different views on the subject for Catholics and 
Protestants. The higher amount of violence Catholics faced made many more Catholics view 
their own use of violence as more legitimate, compared to the Protestants who were 
exposed to much less. The sectarian divide and the increased amount of violence 
experienced on the Catholic side can explain why the IRA was capable of continuously 
gaining more members during the Troubles and after events like Bogside, because more 
Catholics became supportive of the use of violence for political gains and the IRA provided 
an organization for many Catholics who held this view27.  
The Battle of Bogside would mark the beginning period of the Troubles in Ireland. 
With Protestants attacking Catholic minorities and the lack of protection of Catholics being 
provided by Northern Irish police, young Irish Catholics looked to the IRA as a source of 
protection and as a means to resist oppression from Northern Irish Protestants. With the 
Battle of Bogside, new IRA members were joining for religious reasons because they either 
saw, knew or they themselves fell victim to violence due to their Catholic identity. The 
Battle of Bogside led to the British Army being put in place to protect Catholics in Northern 
Ireland, but this would only lead to more conflict between Catholics in Northern Ireland 
against the Irish Protestants and British, resulting in the IRA gaining even more members.  
 
Bloody Sunday 
 Only a few years after Battle of Bogside, another major event in Northern Ireland 
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occurred that would help the IRA gain even more members. January 30th, 1972 came to be 
known as Bloody Sunday as violence in Bogside erupted once again except this time 
between Catholics and the British army. Since the Battle of Bogside, British troops were 
stationed in Derry in order protect the Catholics from the Protestants and maintain peace. 
The British army took steps which they believed would help maintain the peace such as 
barricading nationalist areas, segregating and removing different nationalists and also a 
policy of internment which allowed security forces to imprison suspected “troublesome” 
nationalists and hold them without trial28. In response to the British army’s internment 
policy, many Catholics took part in a march to protest, but the peaceful march soon turned 
violent and resulted in the British army opening fire into a crowd of protestors. Patrick 
Hicks describes the events of Bloody Sunday after interviewing many of those who 
witnessed the event and writing: 
“Like most atrocities, no one is exactly sure how this one began. The British 
soldiers of the First Battalion Parachute Regiment claimed that they were 
fired upon and that they thought nail bombs would be used against them. 
The protesters have vigorously and repeatedly denied such claims. What we 
do know is that shortly before 4 o'clock, the rifles opened up. In the car park 
of Rossville Flats and near the army barricade on Rossville Street and in area 
known as Glenfada Park, 13 lives were taken in less than 20 minutes. Five of 
the dead were shot in the back. No weapon of any kind was ever found on the 
marchers. When it was finally over, 21 soldiers had fired 108 rounds. 
Altnagelvin Hospital was overrun with families who were desperate for news 
of their loved ones. The next day, the Catholic community around Northern 
Ireland rightfully felt that they were being targeted by the British army. 
Whisperings of genocide began to fill the streets. Recruitment in the Irish 
Republican Army skyrocketed and within a few short months bombs were 
going off all over the place”29.  
 
To this day there is confusion as to what led to the British troops to fire on the 
protestors. Some say they were attacked first while others deny any violence being 
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directed at the British soldiers. Upon the aftermath of the shooting it was brought to light 
that none of the protestors shot were armed or even looking in the direction of the troops, 
outrage broke out throughout Ireland and the Catholic communities in Northern Ireland.  
 Bloody Sunday served as an important symbol for the IRA because Bloody Sunday 
symbolized the oppressive government that Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland endured. 
The British Army, which was sent into Northern Ireland with the purpose of protecting 
Catholics, had instead indiscriminately killed Catholics. In many of Lorenzo Bosi’s 
interviews it was very common for IRA members to join because of the British Army’s 
presence and action in Northern Ireland. In Bosi’s 15th interview the former IRA member 
stated: 
“The British army was here to oppress us. When I was going to school I was 
stopped by the army.  Actually it was then that I thought, this is wrong. I was 
then joining riots in the streets. I made a choice at that time, there was 
actually a slogan on the wall, “Join the Na Fianna Eireann,” so I went there, 
and I asked, “Can I join?” and they asked, “Why do you want to join? ,” and I 
said that “I Want to fight for Ireland.” What motivated me was a sense of 
revolution to what the British were doing to our community.  There was a 
mobilization within the community against the British and what they are 
doing, and I just became a part of that. There was a sense of patriotism, to 
defend your people, a reactionary feeling, because you wanted to retaliate to 
what the British were doing against your community”30 (Interview no. 15) 
  
It was very common for IRA members to initially join because they felt oppressed by 
Britain due to its military presence in Northern Ireland. The British army was sent to 
protect Catholics, however, it also actively sought out to destroy the IRA in Northern 
Ireland. Many of the tactics that the British army used only further alienated Catholics and 
drove more to join the IRA. For example, in Lower Falls, a considered nationalist area, a 
curfew was implemented and 3,000 troops conducted house searches. Five people died 
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during these searches and the IRA responded and claimed to provide the only effective 
defense for Northern Catholics and nationalists. From that time on, Catholics started to 
believe the IRA was the only force capable of defending them; not the British military31. 
Bloody Sunday, much like the Battle of Bogside, proved to be an important symbol for the 
IRA because to Catholics in Northern Ireland, the British army represented their status of 
second-class citizens and the oppression they faced in Northern Ireland. The IRA was 
enticing for recruits because of events like Bloody Sunday and other actions the British 
military carried out in Northern Ireland. These incidents were enough proof for many 
Catholics that the British army was not here to defend them, but to further oppress them, 
and that it was necessary to join the IRA to fight back.  
Hunger Strikes 
When people first think of hunger strikes, Mahatma Gandhi in India is the first to 
come to mind. However, Irish nationalists were the first to use hunger strikes as a form of 
political protest in the early 1900s. Irish nationalists (many of which were IRA members) 
would hold hunger strikes in order to attempt to force the British to immediately to give up 
certain actions, policies, or laws throughout the 1900s. The ideologies behind the hunger 
strikes by Irish nationalists were to force the British to quickly adhere to the nationalist’s 
demands or risk the deaths of numerous strikers. The hunger strikes also served a more 
long-term purpose, which was to gain sympathy and support from the Irish public to 
support the nationalists against the British, which in turn led to increased IRA membership. 
How did hunger strikes in Ireland help gain support for nationalists and the IRA? 
Hunger Strikes were successful in gaining support for nationalists and the IRA because of 
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Ireland’s history with hunger strikes, religious attributes associated with hunger strikes, 
and the negative characterization strikers created for the British and unionists in the eyes 
of many Irish nationalists and Catholics.  The hunger strikes alone did not gain support 
from Irish civilians but due to their association with Irish culture and Catholicism in 
Ireland, they succeeded in gaining nationalist support causing IRA membership to increase.  
 Hunger Strikes have always been a common practice in Ireland dating all the way 
back to the medieval period. Hunger strikes were very different in medieval Ireland than 
hunger strikes in Ireland during the 1900s. Despite that, medieval hunger strikes in Ireland 
created an Irish culture that felt empathy for those who partake in such a protest and this 
sympathetic culture towards hunger strikers would continue to exist during the strike of 
the 1900s. David Beresford describes Ireland’s medieval hunger strikes writing,  
“The earlier records place its origins in medieval Ireland where, as Troscad 
(fasting on or against a person) or Cealachan (achieving justice by 
starvation), it had a place in the civil code, the Senchus Mor. The code 
specified the circumstances in which it could be used to recover a debt, or a 
right to perceived justice, the complainant fasting on the doorstep of the 
defendant. If the hunger striker was allowed to die the person at whose door 
he starved himself was held responsible for his death and had to pay 
compensation to his family. It is probable that such fasting had particular 
moral force at the time because honor attached to hospitality and the 
dishonor of having a person starving outside one’s house”32.  
 
Two major differences between the hunger strikes of medieval Ireland and those of 
20th century Ireland were what they were protesting for and whom they were protesting 
against. In medieval Ireland, hunger strikes were carried out by individuals against other 
individuals who they believe owed them some form of reparation for causing the protestor 
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some perceived injustice. But 20th century hunger strikes were not protesting against 
individuals, but were political protests against the British or unionists to encourage 
political change.   
Despite that, Irish society’s cultural views towards protestors and those being 
protested against through hunger strikes had not changed much over the years. Irish 
society saw hospitality as a virtue and allowing someone to starve outside your house due 
to your disagreement was considered inhumane and dishonorable no matter how innocent 
the defendant may be, thus if the person carrying out the hunger strike died, the defendant 
had to pay his or her family reparations and were looked poorly upon by those within their 
community. In the 1900’s, this view was commonly shared and the multitude of hunger 
strikes carried out by Irish nationalists grew. The majority of hunger strikes occurred 
inside prisons where the British held IRA members or other political prisoners. Hunger 
strikes would be organized and launched by prisoners who could be protesting a variety of 
things such as prison conditions, the reasoning for their incarceration, or to support issues 
other prisoners may be facing. The Irish public viewed England as cruel, similar to an 
individual allowing a protestor to die in medieval Ireland, for not giving into hunger strikes 
and allowing Irish nationalists to suffer and die.  
The British inability to end multiple hunger strikes led to increased recruitment for 
the IRA because people were outraged and felt sympathetic to the protestors and saw their 
deaths as unnecessary. The Irish view towards those who conduct hunger strikes and those 
who are targeted in those protests did not change between medieval Ireland and 20th 
century Ireland and the same sentiments towards hunger strikes helped lead to increased 
recruitment for the IRA.  
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 Hunger Strikes in Ireland also had a religious element to them, which helped the IRA 
gain recruits.  Due to the conflict being a sectarian struggle once the IRA and other 
nationalists started to use hunger strikes to protest, it helped the IRA gain new recruits 
because of the Christian idea of self-sacrifice. “Fasting quickly established itself within 
Christianity in the Ireland as a purely symbolic gesture. Fasting and self-sacrifice in general 
began to have a special value in the development of Irish-Christian traditions, more 
particularly so it was linked to or offered up to God in unison with the suffering and self-
sacrifice of Christ33” In Irish Catholic tradition, self-sacrifice had a high value because of 
Christ’s self-sacrifice, and once protestors began to use hunger strikes, Irish Catholics 
widely supported those striking and viewed them very admirably. New members began to 
join the IRA because the strikes proved to many Catholics that the IRA would fight for their 
religious equality because the strikers displayed the Catholic virtue of self-sacrifice. The 
strikers also showed how determined and strong they were by enduring pain for so long 
and demonstrating their willingness to die, which helped the IRA gain new members who 
joined because of the protestor’s commitment.  
 The 1981 hunger strikes are a prime example of how hunger strikes helped the IRA 
and Irish nationalism as a whole gain more support. The 1981 Hunger Strikes occurred 
because in 1976 the British government announced it would not maintain a special 
category for prisoners imprisoned for paramilitary actions but regard them as regular 
prisoners. In addition, Britain passed the responsibility of security of Northern Ireland 
from the British army onto RUC34. In response to being regarded as regular prisoners and 
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not paramilitary prisoners, imprisoned IRA members started a hunger strike, led by Bobby 
Sands an IRA commander, for their status as paramilitary prisoners to be reinstated. The 
hunger strike gained a lot of support from those throughout Ireland who saw those taking 
part as admirable for their devotion due to their willingness of committing to self-sacrifice 
for their cause. The strike ended up having more of an impact on Ireland than expected. 
Sands ended up winning a seat in Fermanagh-South Tyrone over unionist Harry West, 
however, he died shortly afterward but his funeral also showed the impact his hunger 
strike had on the Catholic population with an estimated 100,000 people coming to pay their 
respects and honor him for his self sacrifice35. Nine other protestors died from starvation 
and shortly after the strike ended. The strike had significant political ramifications as Sin 
Fein, the Irish nationalist party, gained a significant amount of seats especially those in 
Northern Ireland, which was very surprising. The IRA also gained numerous members 
because of the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s policy of attempting to work 
with the protestors and allowing them to die. In a response to one of the protestor’s sisters 
asking the Prime Minister to stop the protest, Prime Minster Thatcher responded saying 
she wouldn’t, writing: 
 “I want you to know that despite what is said and written by some people 
about my attitude to the hunger strike, I very much regret that young men 
have been prepared to throw away their lives for an objective which – as I 
have said on many occasions – no responsible Government anywhere could 
grant, since it could only aid and abet those who advocate and use violence to 
political ends36.” 
 
The Prime Minister’s unwillingness to try and stop the hunger strike created a lot of 
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anger among many in Ireland so the IRA capitalized on this and gained more recruits. The 
IRA almost successfully assassinated her, which proved to many that the IRA was a serious 
group determined to fight the British and end Catholic suffering in Northern Ireland 
bringing in more recruits into the fold. 
  The combination of Ireland’s cultural history and Irish Catholicism’s association to 
hunger strikes helped draw in many recruits for the IRA. The public in Ireland viewed 
protestors in hunger strikes favorably because they represented Catholicism and 
willingness to self-sacrifice, which inspired many to join the IRA. The hunger strikes also 
cast the British as cruel oppressors willing to allow protestors to starve themselves to 
death which helped gain sympathy from many in Ireland.  Because of Ireland’s culture of 
hospitality, the British willingness to allow Irish nationalist Catholics to starve themselves 
was viewed as unacceptable and drove more people to join the IRA.  
Concluding Points on IRA 
 The purpose of this case study was to look at how recruitment is what led the IRA to 
exist longer than any other modern terrorist organization, and how many of the same 
recruitment characteristics of the IRA are shared by modern religious terrorist 
organizations. The IRA was meant to be a secular organization, which fought for the 
creation of an independent Ireland and later unification of the Republic of Ireland with 
Northern Ireland, but ended up having non-secular characteristics. The IRA was not 
completely secular because the different political views by Protestants and Catholics led to 
a sectarian divide between the two. The IRA benefited from the political divide between 
Catholics and Protestants because it helped the organization continue to gain members 
inspired to fight against the British and Northern Irish Protestants. Policies created and 
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physical force used by the British and Protestants, aimed to suppress Irish nationalist’s 
claims for an independent and unified Ireland, backfired because with most nationalists 
being Catholic, it created a perception among Catholics that they were being suppressed 
due to their religious beliefs and led to many individuals joining the IRA. The IRA also used 
hunger strikes, which were popular in Irish Catholic tradition because they resembled 
Christ’s self-sacrifice, which helped gain sympathy and more members for the IRA because 
they saw the IRA as a righteous and serious organization. Due to the IRA’s link with 
Catholicism through sectarian issues and religious symbols, it was capable of recruiting for 
generations and allowed the group to exist for nine decades.  With religious terrorist 
organizations such as al Qaeda and ISIS sharing many of the same characteristics as the 
IRA, it suggests that they have the ability to survive for much longer than previous 
terrorists organizations and exist for just as long as the IRA. 
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Al Qaeda and ISIS 
Today’s terrorist groups have the ability to survive for much longer than those that 
existed in the past because they have distinct recruiting advantages that were not 
previously available. Religious ideologies, religious symbols, sectarian issues, and 
globalization due to advancements in technology have all been beneficial to the survival of 
current religious terrorist groups because they generate more potential recruits for these 
organizations. By focusing on two terrorist organizations, al Qaeda and The Islamic State 
(ISIS), which formed out of al Qaeda, one can see how their successful recruitment has led 
to their continued survival amid the numerous difficulties each has faced. Both groups are 
Islamic terrorist organizations, however, both had different political and religious 
ideologies along with different recruitment strategies. They have similarities in 
recruitment strategies in that they focus on appealing to recruits through their religious 
ideals and rely on modern technology in order to promote their causes.  
Al Qaeda  
Background: 
The origins of al Qaeda can first be drawn back to the militant group the 
mujahedeen. The mujahedeen had developed in order to fight back against the newly 
formed Afghani government, the Peoples democracy of Afghanistan, in 1978. Due to the 
government’s lack of power it allied itself with the Soviet Union who would send 30,000 
troops to defend and assist the new Afghani government against the rebels. With 
widespread distaste of the new government’s policies and the presence of Soviet soldiers 
among Muslims in the country, the mujahedeen fought both of them until the Soviet army 
left and the Peoples Democracy of Afghanistan had fallen. Shortly after, Osama bin Laden, a 
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former mujahedeen member, would become the leader of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda was founded 
under the ideology that Muslim countries should abandon secularism and adopt 
governments and public affairs that are guided by Islamic law. In doing so, al Qaeda needed 
to end U.S. and Western power in the Middle East because of the influence they had over 
the region. In order to establish Islamic states in the Middle East, al Qaeda launched a 
terrorist campaign against the United States and their fatal attack on 9/11 would change 
the way the world looked at terrorism. Shortly after the attack, the U.S. invaded 
Afghanistan to crush al Qaeda. That has yet to occur and al Qaeda still operates sixteen 
years after the attack.  
In what follows, I am going to examine the religious aspects of al Qaeda that helped 
the group attain thousands of followers, ultimately allowing the group to survive for over a 
decade despite the enormous effort put in by the United States and its allies to destroy the 
al Qaeda organization.  
Religiosity 
 As previously discussed, the religiosity of religious terrorist groups is questionable, 
and when looking at al Qaeda, one can see that the religious ideologies of al Qaeda do not 
seem to be the focal point of the group’s existence, but are instead entwined within the 
group’s political aims in order to justify their claims37. Specifically, al Qaeda desires to 
create and promote Islamic fundamentalism in Middle Eastern states and other highly 
populated Muslim countries. Islamic fundamentalism became a popular movement shortly 
after the Iranian revolution when the Government of Islamic Republic was created. Al 
Qaeda and Osama bin laden believed it was necessary for Muslim countries to adopt 
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Islamic governments and abandon existing secular governments as Iran did. However, they 
saw that in order to do so it was imperative to end foreign influence in the Middle East, 
especially influence from the United States and other western powers.  
 Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda wanted to create political change in the Middle East 
and end the influence of foreign powers in the region which was a popular philosophy 
among many in the Middle East. However, al Qaeda, and its leader Osama bin Laden, 
needed to become even more popular and gain more members if it were to launch a 
successful or lasting campaign. In order to do this, al Qaeda aimed at persuading Muslims 
to join because of the religious disdain the U.S and the west had towards Muslims. An 
anonymous CIA operative in his book ”Imperial Hubris” describes how Osama bin Laden 
created a sense that western powers, especially the U.S., is a force that must be met with 
violence because of the destruction that the U.S. was causing and will continue to inflict on 
Muslims: 
“Part of bin Laden's genius is that he recognized early on the difference 
between issues Muslims find offensive about America and the West, and 
those they find intolerable and life threatening. The difference, that is, that 
moves large numbers of people from demonstrating with placards to 
demolishing with plastic explosives. And in the movement-causing category 
fall, almost exclusively, U.S. political, military, and economic policies toward 
the Islamic world”38.  
 
 Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda conveyed that their political goals were religiously 
motivated because they wanted to mobilize more Muslims to use physical force to resist 
the U.S. and did so by framing that United States foreign policy as being detrimental to 
Muslims. They knew that just simply highlighting the differences concerning political and 
cultural issues between the Middle East and the West would not gain as much support for 
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their terrorist group39. Al Qaeda would point to U.S. foreign policy issues such as the United 
States support of Israel and how this alliance had been detrimental to Muslims and, in fact, 
could be seen as an attack on Islam. Osama bin Laden wrote a letter to America outlining 
the reasons why the U.S was an enemy to al Qaeda and thus promoted using violence to end 
American foreign policy actions in the Middle East, writing: 
 You attacked us in Palestine…Palestine, which has sunk under military 
occupation for more than 80 years. The British handed over Palestine, with 
your help and your support, to the Jews, who have occupied it for more than 
50 years; years overflowing with oppression, tyranny, crimes, killing, 
expulsion, destruction and devastation. The creation and continuation of 
Israel is one of the greatest crimes, and you are the leaders of its criminals. 
And of course there is no need to explain and prove the degree of American 
support for Israel…Each and every person whose hands have become 
polluted in the contribution towards this crime must pay its price” [Letter 
from bin Laden to America in 2002]40. 
 
 Shortly after WWII, the British controlled modern day Israel and despite most of the 
land being inhabited by Muslims, the British allowed for the Jewish state of Israel to be 
created resulting in thousands of Muslims being displaced by the Jewish State. Since then, 
the Jewish state has continued to grow and has pushed further into Palestinian territory 
causing more displacement of Muslims and continued conflicts between Palestinians and 
Israel. Due to the U.S. support of Israel, especially through military and economic means, 
the U.S. has become a major issue for Muslims wishing to stop Israel’s control of the Holy 
Land and continued suppression of Muslims in Israel and Palestine. Due to the U.S 
supporting Israel, many Muslims worldwide see the U.S. support of a harsh Israel as anti 
Islamic. This idea was extremely popular within al Qaeda. As seen above in bin Laden’s 
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statement, he claims that the U.S support of Israel is a crime against Muslims because the 
U.S. holds responsibility for the oppression that many Muslims face because of Israel. Yildar 
Muhammad, an al Qaeda member, writes about how the United States support of Israel was 
part of his motivation to join al Qaeda and said, “All of us have grown up learning about 
injustice brought on Palestine. My generation was never able to do anything about that. 
This was the chance for me and my generation to take up the cause and take on the root of 
the cause, which is American and its support for Israel”41.  
Al Qaeda also points out other oppressive U.S foreign policy issues in the Middle 
East such as U.S military bases in the region, desire for oil, and economic sanctions placed 
on Muslim majority countries42. Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda blame many of the issues 
Muslims in the Middle East face on U.S foreign policy which they said has led to economic 
issues, oppression of Muslims, lack of sovereignty, and starvation in some cases, such as in 
Iraq after the U.S. placed sanctions on the country43. Al Qaeda uses the outcome of U.S. 
foreign policies on Muslims and highlights them as attacks on all Muslims and Islam and 
claim that the U.S. is doing this intentionally. By al Qaeda claiming that their political issues 
with the Middle East policies of the U.S and the West are truly based on religious issues, 
they were able to develop more membership because Muslims then began to view Islam as 
being oppressed by foreign powers. Religious terrorists groups use religion to portray their 
conflict as good versus evil and to demonize any opposing views of the group, which is the 
effect al Qaeda had by portraying the U.S. as an evil force against Islam44.  
Religious Symbols 
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Al Qaeda, like many other religious terrorists groups, uses religious symbols and 
historical moments to support their ideology as a way to appeal to potential recruits. In 
secular and non-secular religious terrorist groups, symbols are important for group 
cohesion and recruitment. For religious terrorists, these effects are enhanced because 
religious symbols are generally even more powerful than symbols non-secular terrorist 
groups use45. This is a successful recruiting method used by al Qaeda because most of their 
recruits and members do not have a full understanding of their own religion and are 
vulnerable to misinterpretations of it, so al Qaeda can use Islamic symbols and history to 
“insert a skewed view of Islamic teachings into their heads”46. The ability of al Qaeda to 
insert their views of Islam and how Islam pertains to current political issues helps the 
organization recruit new members because they can effectively develop the religious and 
political views of individuals who are susceptible to al Qaeda’s teachings, and convince 
them that joining al Qaeda is in their best interests.  
One of the common religious symbols al Qaeda uses, along with other Islamic 
terrorists including ISIS, is the Islamic ideology of jihad. The word jihad is an Islamic term 
with many meanings. One is someone’s internal struggle with his faith in Islam. Another is 
striving to preach the teachings of Islam and directly translates to “struggling or striving”47. 
Despite that, jihad is now popularly thought to be the use of violence by an individual or 
group who claim to use it to fight for Islam which, is in large part, because of today’s Islamic 
terrorists declaring their violent struggle as being motivated by religion. Like majority of 
religions, Islam promotes peace and strongly condemns the killing of any other person, 
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however, it also mentions how violence can be used in order to defend oneself, those in 
their community, and the Islamic faith48. Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists have 
declared jihad in order to gain support from other Muslims and display to potential recruits 
that their use of violence, also used by other religious groups, is a divine duty because it is 
religiously imperative49. Nevertheless, al Qaeda does not properly adhere to the 
mainstream ideology of military jihad, according to many Islamic scholars, yet, with al 
Qaeda taking advantage of individual’s lack of religious education, they have projected their 
perception of jihad onto others and convinced them to join and fight with al Qaeda. The 
Islamic Supreme Council of America outlines the term jihad and in the description it states, 
“If there is no peaceful alternative, Islam also allows the use of force, but there are strict 
rules of engagement. Innocents - such as women, children, or invalids - must never be 
harmed, and any peaceful overtures from the enemy must be accepted”50. Clearly al 
Qaeda’s claim to fighting jihad does not fit into this definition of a physical force of jihad 
because it does not follow the strict rules of engagement for starters, yet due to al Qaeda’s 
ability to spread their religious ideology to the religiously uninformed, it does not matter.  
Al Qaeda can inspire many members to join through the idea of a “defensive jihad” because 
misinformed recruits may believe that al Qaeda is properly adhering to the rules of jihad 
despite its very strange interpretation of it.  
Al Qaeda’s use of jihad is unique from other Islamic terrorist groups due to the fact 
that al Qaeda stresses that its use of jihad is only being implemented for defensive 
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purposes for Muslims and Islam. This type of jihad is known as a “defensive jihad” because 
al Qaeda claims to be fighting the U.S. in order to defend Islam and Muslims, and doesn’t 
seek to a become an offensive organization with more expansionist goals. In one message 
read by Osama bin Laden he states, “crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a 
clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims”. Bin Laden asserts that al 
Qaeda’s attacks against the United States are not meant to be offensive attacks, but 
defensive because the United States’ foreign policy in the Middle East has forced al Qaeda 
to act defensively. Many people in the Muslim world already dislike U.S. presence in their 
countries and view the U.S. as an imperial and colonial power and that the War on 
Terrorism is instead a war on Islam51. Due to many Muslims believing U.S. actions in the 
Middle East are focused on attacking Islam, al Qaeda’s portrayal of fighting a “defensive 
jihad” may draw in many recruits who desire to protect Islam from America.  
Many critics of al Qaeda’s claim of fighting a “defensive jihad” point out that al Qaeda 
is more offensive than defensive because al Qaeda routinely targets civilians and launches 
aggressive attacks against the U.S. However, al Qaeda still states that these attacks are in 
reaction to the U.S. attack on Islam because citizens elect those in the U.S. government and 
pay taxes. Osama bin Laden explains why civilians are also targets saying, “A man is 
considered a fighter whether he carries a gun or pays taxes to help kill us.  So when they 
say bin Laden kills civilians, who are they killing in Palestine? Children.  Our aim is that 
every American man is an enemy whether he kills us or pays taxes to kill us”52. According 
to bin Laden, American civilians may as well be soldiers because they pay taxes and shape 
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the U.S government though elections and that has led to the death of many Muslims. Al 
Qaeda describes their seemingly aggressive attacks as part of their “defensive jihad” 
despite the fact that they are aimed at civilians. Al Qaeda holds U.S. civilians responsible for 
the government’s actions because they elect those in power. Mohammed Siddique Khan is a 
former al Qaeda member and leader of the 2005 London suicide bombings, and he 
described why he and al Qaeda were targeting civilians writing,  
“Your (the West’s) democratically elected governments continue to 
perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. Your support for 
them makes you directly responsible ... until we feel security, you will be our 
targets. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my 
people, we will not stop”53.  
 In his statement, one can clearly see how he still portrays western countries as the 
aggressors against Muslims due to their foreign policy activities in the Middle East. He also 
holds citizens of these countries responsible for U.S. actions and considers them to be 
potential targets if their governments continue attacking Islam. They deserve what they get 
because they selected their states’ leaders who have caused devastation for many Muslims 
in the Middle East. Al Qaeda has continuously tried to promote their defensive jihadist view 
in order to gain recruits because many Muslims view the U.S as an enemy to Islam and by al 
Qaeda proclaiming to defend Muslims many recruits may be inspired to join.  
In the Qur’an it also teaches that it is each Muslim’s personal responsibility to 
contribute to a jihad in any way they can if Islam, its followers, or their land is under attack 
and those that don’t partake, will face God’s judgment54.  This places an incentive for 
Muslims to join because they may feel devoted to protect Islam. As previously referenced, 
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many al Qaeda members are not fully educated in their religion and if Al Qaeda can 
persuade recruits that Islam is under threat, they may join al Qaeda’s “defensive jihad”. 
Jihad is an important symbol for al Qaeda’s recruitment because their claim to be fighting a 
“defensive jihad” paints the U.S. as the aggressor because of American foreign policy. In 
addition, many Muslims already believe that the U.S. is waging a war on Islam regardless of 
al Qaeda’s influence. A “defensive jihad” may appear to be more attractive to those Muslims 
leading to additional recruits joining al Qaeda. On top of that it is also the personal 
obligation of each Muslim to assist in a jihad in any way they can, and for those that view 
the U.S. as an enemy to Islam, they may be much more inclined to join al Qaeda and wage a 
“defensive jihad”.  
Al Qaeda also uses historical religious events to help gain recruits. For example, 
Osama bin Laden would often say that the U.S. is like the Christians in The Crusades, 
leading multiple campaigns against Muslims in order to take their holy lands. Bin Laden 
would say things such as “The new crusade led by the Americans against the Islamic 
nations” and how a battle would sure be soon to begin “between the Islamic world and the 
Americans and their Allies”55. Al Qaeda describes the predominantly Christian U.S. as 
modern crusaders wishing to take control of the Holy Land and Middle East and in doing so 
cause harm to Muslims along the way.  The connection of The Crusades and the U.S. foreign 
policy by al Qaeda served as an important recruitment tactic because it symbolized the 
effects the U.S had on Muslims and also painted U.S involvement in the Middle East as 
aggressive. Al Qaeda’s description of America as being modern day crusaders could also be 
tied into the al Qaeda ideology of waging a “defensive jihad” because by al Qaeda 
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portraying the U.S as a crusader, they could state they were fighting in reaction to the 
aggressive and predatory United States. A former al Qaeda member named Momin Khawaja 
talked about his view of the United States being a modern crusader as a reason for his 
radicalization stating,  
“Would the American and British political leaders learn any lessons from 
their failure in the on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan? For over 13 years, 
they were not engaged to promote democracy or to protect human dignity 
and rights or any logical discourse against the ruthless authoritarianism. 
They are leading a new Crusade against the Muslim world. Every beginning 
has its end. It is just that most transgressors do not know about it when they 
crossover the limits of the Laws of God”56.  
 
Khawaja, and other al Qaeda recruits, understand U.S foreign policy to be a modern 
day crusade because of al Qaeda’s use of the historical significance as well as the many 
actions the U.S takes in the Middle East which violate the sovereignty of many Middle 
Eastern countries. Many Muslims around the world, whether or not they are a member of a 
terrorist group, view U.S. actions as a War on Islam,57 and al Qaeda uses this popular idea 
and ties it back to The Crusades to help gain sympathy and legitimize the organization’s use 
of violence, helping them grow their membership.   
The way al Qaeda proclaims their use of “defensive jihad” and their portrayal of the 
United States as crusaders is done in order to gain recruits and sympathizers, which has 
helped the group survive for decades. Due to al Qaeda being focused on fighting foreign 
powers, it is essential for them to use historical and religious symbols to make the U.S. 
appear even more aggressive in order to demonize the U.S. Al Qaeda’s use of jihad and 
historical moments is very similar to the hunger strikes used by IRA members. Both 
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terrorist groups used historically religious motivated techniques and in doing so gained 
sympathy for their organization, causing more members to join, helping both groups 
survive for so long. 
ISIS 
Background: 
The Islamic state first formed in 1999, but did not start gaining international 
attention until recently. The Islamic state began in Iraq shortly after the U.S invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, and was led by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Bin Laden funded Zarqawi’s organization in 
Iraq, however, with Zarqawi not sharing the same goals as bin Laden and al Qaeda, the 
Islamic State did not affiliate itself with al Qaeda until negotiations between the two groups 
led to the unification of the jihadist groups and the Islamic state renaming itself “al Qaeda 
of Iraq” (AQI)58.  Despite the two groups unification, there were still stark differences 
between the al Qaeda and its affiliate AQI. Over time, different political events, diverging 
ideologies, and al Qaeda’s organization would cause AQI and al Qaeda to cut ties and AQI to 
rename itself ISIS in 2012. In 2012, the Islamic State would experience a revival as new 
members flocked to ISIS under new leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi due to the group’s idea of 
establishing an Islamic state, increased violence in Iraq, and the beginning of the Syrian 
Civil War.  
Religiosity 
Despite both groups wishing to form Islamic governments, ISIS has a much more 
hardline approach and its goals are focused more on challenging the current state system 
by unifying Muslim countries in the Middle East under a caliphate, while al Qaeda worked 
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to establish Islamic State governments in existing states. Despite these different political 
ambitions, they both are supporting the development of Islamic government, though the 
Islamic States’ political goals matched with their religious perception of their political goals 
have led to much more recruitment for ISIS since its revival in 2012.  
While both groups wish to overthrow governments in the Middle East and form 
Islamic governments, they view their enemies, as well as the obstacles preventing them 
from achieving their goals, differently. Al Qaeda viewed foreign actors, specifically the U.S., 
as their enemies who were preventing the development of Islamic governments. Therefore, 
their focus was primarily on fighting the U.S. ISIS’s ideology is different in that the group 
believes that regional actors are the main force preventing the creation of Islamic 
governments so they focus more of their attention to combating those within their region, 
specifically the Asad regime in Syria, Abadi regime in Iraq, and those that do not adhere to 
their political and religious ideologies.59 
ISIS focuses their attention and resources more on regional adversaries because 
they wish to develop a caliphate, which is a Muslim community in a region, ruled over by a 
political and religious leader the called caliph who is meant to be the successor of 
Muhammad. ISIS linked their political aspiration of establishing a caliphate to Muhammad’s 
travel from Mecca to Medina in 622 C.E when Muhammad established a caliphate in 
Medina, which was the first base in which Islam began to grow after he fled Mecca to 
escape religious persecution. Sabhan Khalef Ali al-Juburi, an ISIS leader, spoke about how 
he and ISIS are following the work of the Prophet stating, “Following the example of the 
Prophet when he left Mecca for Medina and established the Islamic State there, not-
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withstanding the alliance of the idolaters and the People of the Book against him…the 
territories under our control equal in expanse the first State in Medina”60. ISIS’s goal in 
establishing a caliphate has been popular among many jihadists and has been a major 
incentive for new members who wish to join in order to unite all Muslims under one 
caliphate and end existing state governments. 
Before ISIS split from al Qaeda, central al Qaeda leadership supported the Islamic 
States’ desire to develop a caliphate in Iraq, but al Qaeda’s support of ISIS started to fade 
due to al Qaeda losing control of its own state building abilities, the hardline ideologies of 
the Islamic State and ISIS’s eagerness to become engaged in Syria61. If jihadist groups were 
placed on a political spectrum, al Qaeda would be placed on the left and ISIS on the far right 
because ISIS has a much stricter ideology of the Qur’an and its goal in creating a caliphate 
for all Muslims; a much less popular idea for al Qaeda62.  
However, al Qaeda did not understand the high number of jihadists that support this 
much more conservative political and religious ideology, which led to many jihadists 
joining ISIS instead of al Qaeda. ISIS’s early success in 2014, in which it took large amount 
of territory in Iraq and Syria, helped prove to many jihadists that the organization was 
determined to focus on establishing a caliphate and not fighting foreign powers as al Qaeda 
did in order for states to individually form Islamic governments. “The reality of a proto-
state and ISIS’s willingness to try to govern- this Khilafa project, as many within the group 
call it- is quite appealing to jihadists. ISIS is not only talking the talk about establishing an 
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Islamic state, it is walking the walk”63 which, has attracted many foreign fighters to its side. 
Al-Azy was a captured member of ISIS and in an interview with CNN from his prison cell in 
Iraq, he explained why he joined ISIS stating, “I was a believer. I believed in the caliphate 
and I believed in the Islamic State. They said the pledge to the caliph is from the days of the 
Prophet and those who don't pledge are not Muslims. I was convinced by this”64. ISIS’s 
political goal of uniting Syria and Iraq and forming a caliphate as the Prophet had done has 
been popular among jihadists and along with ISIS success in gaining territory, the group 
had legitimized itself to many recruits. The very conservative ideology of ISIS and its ability 
to form a caliphate has led to increased membership from individuals such as al-Azy 
because they believe in the formation of the caliphate and see joining ISIS as the best 
means to do so because the organization has been quite successful in doing so.  
Religious/ Political issues which help Recruitment 
 One essential recruitment tool for ISIS has been Sunni disfranchisement and 
growing sectarian lines in Iraq and Syria. For centuries, since the religious split of the Sunni 
and Shiite Muslims, there has been conflict between both sects and ISIS has cleverly used 
this sectarian struggle, especially with tensions between both sects worsening in both 
states, to recruit many members65.  ISIS claims to be the champion of Sunni Muslims in 
their struggles against the Iraqi and Syrian regimes. Because of the political climates in 
both countries, many Sunni Muslims have been convinced that it is necessary for them to 
join ISIS because they believe that Sunni’s are under attack and that they must fight back, 
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and that a Sunni Muslim Caliphate will create a government that best represents Sunni 
interests.   
One major factor, which has helped draw in thousands of recruits for ISIS and led to 
the group’s revival back in 2012, is the Syrian conflict. Many ISIS members joined because 
they see the violent struggle in the Syrian Civil War in sectarian terms. For decades, Syria 
has been under the rule of the Assad family while the Sunni Muslims who make up about 
75% of Syria’s population have experienced repression. The Alawites make up only 15% of 
population but have control of the government and private sector66. The civil war started in 
2011 when protests erupted in Syria over the discontent with the Assad-controlled 
government and for the removal of Bashar-al-Assad as the President of Syria. Once these 
protests were met with a violent response by the Assad government, a war started between 
the rebels and the government with Sunni Muslims making up the majority of the Syrian 
rebels. The religious and political divide that developed between the Syrian government 
and the Syrian Sunni population helped ISIS recruit thousands of members. Many ISIS 
members joined because they believed that Sunni Muslims in Syria face genocide and that 
they have a moral obligation to defend other Sunni Muslims and their religious identity 
from the Assad government67. With the Assad regime using brutal tactics, such as the use of 
chemical weapons, bombings, and the targeting of civilians, ISIS has been able to gain many 
recruits because most of the communities the Assad government targets are Sunni because 
they support of the rebellion.  A woman, whose name is kept anonymous for her protection, 
who is a former member of ISIS explains how conditions in Syria led to her joining ISIS 
saying, “Everything around us was chaos. Free Syrian Army, the regime, barrel bombs, 
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strikes, the wounded, clinics, blood -- you want to tear yourself away, to find something to 
run to. My problem was I ran away to something uglier"68. By the Assad government 
attacking Sunnis, ISIS was able to gain many members because many Sunnis believed 
joining ISIS as fulfilling a jihad because their faith and the people of their faith are in danger 
due to the Syrian government’s targeting of civilians, especially Sunni Muslims.  
ISIS has also been able to recruit thousands of members to join in Iraq because of 
the religious divide within the country. In Iraq, Sunni Muslims are a minority making up 
42% of Muslims, while the majority of other Muslims in Iraq are Shia69. Before the fall of 
Saddam Hussein, the Sunni’s held more political power, but once the U.S. invaded Iraq and 
formed a new government there, a predominantly Shiite government took over and has left 
much of the Sunni population feeling disenfranchised especially with many of the Iraqi 
government’s policies and actions which have marginalized the Sunnis. The change of 
power in Iraq has created an abundance of potential recruits for ISIS because of the 
sectarian divide between Sunni and Shiites because ISIS can convince many Sunnis that 
already feel disenfranchised that in order to gain equality, it is necessary to join ISIS and 
wage jihad against the Iraqi government. Thahir Sahab Jamel, a former ISIS member, states 
how he joined ISIS to fight the mostly Shia Iraqi government saying, “A man named Salam 
talked to me and got me connected to ISIS. He told me I needed to be a jihadist and fight the 
Shia government. He convinced me to fight the government. I started getting involved as 
they were planning operations to begin in Iraq and Syria”70. Many Sunni Muslims view the 
Shia government as illegitimate as it has led to the disfranchisement of the Sunni 
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population. ISIS has been able to recruit many members by capitalizing on this view 
towards the Iraqi government.  
In an email written by a Sunni Muslim women living in Iraq, she writes about her 
observation as to why many young Sunni Muslim men have joined ISIS due to the violent 
experiences Sunni communities have endured because of their treatment as second-class 
citizens by the Shia government and U.S. and ally airstrikes in Sunni communities: 
“The bombardment was carried out by the government. The air strikes 
focused on wholly on civilian neighborhoods. Maybe they wanted to target 
two ISIS bases. But neither round of bombardment found its target. One target 
is a house connected to a church where ISIS men live. It is next to the 
neighborhood generator and about 200-300 meters from our home. The 
bombing hurt civilians only and demolished the generator. Now we don’t have 
any electricity since yesterday night. I am writing from a mobile device in my 
sister’s house, which is empty. The government bombardment did not hit any 
of the ISIS men. I have just heard from a relative who visited us to check on us 
after that terrible night. He says that because of this bombardment, 
youngsters are joining ISIS in tens if not hundreds because this increase 
hatred towards the government, which doesn’t care about us as Sunnis being 
killed and targeted. Government forces went to Amerli, a Shia village 
surrounded by tens of Sunni villages, though Amerli was never taken by ISIS. 
The government militias attacked the surrounding Sunni villages, killing 
hundreds, with help from the American air strikes”71. 
 
Due to ISIS members identifying as Sunni Muslims in Iraq, they have taken control 
and operate out of mostly Sunni communities. However, this makes it much more difficult 
politically for the U.S. and Iraq because the unintentional killing of civilian Sunni Muslims 
not affiliated with ISIS can cause individuals within these targeted communities to be 
pushed towards joining ISIS because they feel as though their communities, families, 
religious identity, and they themselves are under attack. Also, the lack of protection 
provided by the Iraqi government had led to further tensions. Iraqi militias and the 
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governments military have on numerous occasions given security priority to Shia 
communities over Sunni communities in combating ISIS, and in the eyes of many Sunnis 
shows the government’s unequal treatment of the two different Muslim sects.  
A study conducted by Quantum Communications interviewed 49 ISIS members who 
either were detained or defected from the group in Iraq and Syria, to see what their 
motivations were for joining the terrorist organization. This study compiled the 49 
subject’s motivational reasons, the most common having to do with defending Sunnis. 
Many of the other reasons they described also had to do with defending Sunnis such as the 
waging a jihad and the war in Syria.  It is their opinion that they are launching a holy war in 
order to create a better government and life for Sunnis72.  
 
The number of people among 49 current and former members of extremist groups in Iraq and Syria 
influenced by each factor in joining the fight (George LeVines / Defense One. Data: Quantum 
Communications)73 
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 The research and the graph above from Quantum Communications shows how 
sectarian issues in both Iraq and Syria have led to increased recruitment for ISIS. With 
Sunni disfranchisement occurring in both countries, many Sunnis have joined ISIS because 
they believe it will create a state where they are no longer inferior to other religious groups 
and can take control their own governments. ISIS’s successful recruitment in both 
countries is also quite similar to the IRA’s successful recruitment in Northern Ireland 
during the Troubles. The Sunni disfranchisement in both states is much like Catholic 
disfranchisement in Northern Ireland during the 1970s and 1980s that caused many Irish 
Catholics to join the IRA to change the social and political status quo. The sectarian divide 
helped the IRA recruit for decades and with sectarian issues existing for years in both Syria 
and Iraq with no sign of a solution in either state, ISIS can capitalize on this turmoil and 
continue to recruit disenfranchised Sunni’s helping to ensuring ISIS’s survival.  
Social Media 
Today’s terrorist groups also have a new strategic element for recruiting new 
members, unavailable to previous terrorist groups, and that is social media. Social media is 
not unique to only some of today’s religious terrorists groups because they all share a 
special relationship with it. Social media has been beneficial for existing terrorist groups 
because it is a cheap, effective, and low risk method of recruiting. Social media has helped 
various religious terrorist groups because social media has allowed terrorist groups to 
reach larger audiences, target young audiences, and use new methods of propaganda 
making their recruiting more effective.  
  Social media allows terrorist groups to recruit members globally instead of solely 
relying on possible recruits from within their local population. Recruiters for today’s 
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terrorist groups can simply log into any social media site, find and meet people online who 
they believe are prone to being radicalized and entice them to join their group. Facebook is 
the most popular form of social media with around 1.8 billion users logging on at least once 
a month74. The popularity of Facebook gives terrorist groups access to such a large pool of 
people that it becomes much easier to find potential new members. Geoff Dean explains 
how religious terrorist groups utilize social media, specifically Facebook, to recruit 
members: 
“The most important and useful Facebook feature for terrorist organization 
is the ‘groups’ function. The apparent strategy used by terrorist 
organizations is to create a Facebook groups based on a seemingly innocent 
ideal, such as supporting Palestinians or Islam in general. As member 
numbers of the group increase, jihadist material can be slowly introduced by 
the members of the organization to the Facebook group in a way which does 
which does not directly condone or encourage jihadist actions, and thus does 
not constitute a violation of Facebook policy. From this position, the group 
can even be directed straight to the websites and forums of the terrorist 
organization behind the Facebook group.”75 
 
  Members of ISIS and al Qaeda can utilize Facebook by drawing in people by creating 
a group that looks appealing to many users throughout the site. Groups terrorists create on 
Facebook will more than likely have no direct reference to the group or terrorist actions, 
but will be about topics that may relate to the group’s ideology or certain political 
positions. The description of the groups that terrorists create aim to target individuals who 
may be more likely to be radicalized, so recruiters develop Facebook groups which would 
be more likely to target these individuals. For example, ISIS recruiters may create a 
Facebook group that supports more Sunni political representation in IRAQ, or a group that 
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supports Palestine against Israeli military actions relying on the religiosity of each conflict. 
If ISIS were to create a group that was about something that did not remotely relate to their 
group’s cause, such as a Red Sox fan club, they would fail to attract those who may be 
interested in fighting for ISIS, and instead attract Red Sox fans who would only relate to 
fighting with Yankee fans. Once the recruiters gain a decent amount of member, recruiters 
start posting content about jihad and see what response members give.  Those who appear 
to be more enthusiastic about the content will likely be contacted further because they are 
much more likely to be radicalized and join the terrorist organization. Religious terrorist 
groups have benefited greatly from social media platforms such as Facebook because it 
allows them to recruit new members through the Internet who might live all across the. An 
ISIS or al Qaeda member may sign onto Facebook in the Middle East and recruit an 
individual living in Europe or North America. The 22,000 foreign fighters in Syria in Iraq 
who joined ISIS from 100 different countries show how effective social media has been for 
recruitment for today’s religious terrorist groups because it was able to increase ISIS 
membership by reaching out to recruits thousands of miles away76.  
 Social media as a tool of recruitment may also lead to ISIS, al Qaeda and other 
groups being viable for a greater length of time because of the age group social media 
caters to the most. A survey conducted by the Pew Research Center found that those under 
30 years old were much more likely to use social media and be more active on social media 
than those older than 5077. With the majority of social media users being under 30, 
religious terrorist groups are benefit greatly from social because it gives ISIS and al Qaeda 
the ability to attain new members necessary for the group’s survival past one generation. 
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Many terrorist organizations fail to inspire younger generations to join and continue the 
group’s cause. They fade away and cease to exist as members age and die. However, social 
media gives existing religious terrorist groups more of an advantage in surviving because 
they can inspire younger people through its various channels.  
 Social media has also made sharing videos to wide audiences much easier, and in 
many cases, today’s religious terrorist organizations have used videos on social media to 
encourage viewers to join their cause. Similar to the IRA, much of ISIS and al- Qaeda’s 
propaganda is created in reaction to political or military events and is aimed at inspiring 
people to join. Visuals have been known to cause more impressions on people than just 
text. For example, in the U.S. during the Vietnam War, much of the violence was captured 
on film and anti-war sentiment was spurred because of the public’s realization of the 
carnage in warfare. Al Qaeda and ISIS have both used video for propaganda and 
recruitment purposes, however, ISIS is much better known for their videos. In many of 
ISIS’s videos, they capture combat footage and show images and videos of their group’s 
successes such as their video showing bulldozer’s destroying the Syrian Iraqi border. They 
also use videos to recruit new members.  For example, in a video entitles, “There is No Life 
Without Jihad”, two western ISIS members are addressing Muslims and claiming they 
should join ISIS by saying things like “the cure for depression is Jihad” and “you can be here 
in the golden time or you can be on the sideline for which you will have to answer on 
judgment day”78. With social media platforms such as YouTube, these messages can be 
spread worldwide and be viewed by thousands of people quickly. Because of the effects 
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imagery has on people and current religious groups ability to broadcast their videos 
through social media, they can effectively and rather simply upload videos inspiring people 
to join their terrorist organization.  
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Counterterrorism  
Background 
Terrorist organizations can cease to exist for a variety of reasons. Terrorist groups 
can be dismantled by a state or states, a group could lack the financial resources needed to 
operate, and in rare instances, a group can also succeed and lose its need to continue to 
operate. There are many more possibilities as to why terrorist groups ceases to exist, 
however, religious terrorism seems unique in that is has many qualities that may lead to 
groups transcending normal difficulties previous groups have had to face in order to 
survive.  Accepting that religious terrorist groups such as ISIS and al Qaeda have a much 
higher probability of surviving for longer than different forms of terrorist groups due to 
their religiosity and other present day factors, what are some ways in which states can 
effectively employ counterterrorism measures against today’s leading international 
terrorist groups? And what counterterrorism measures should states avoid? 
 
End The U.S. War on Terrorism  
U.S. military counterintelligence strategies used thus far to combat today’s religious 
terrorist organizations, have caused a wide range of issues for the United States. U.S. 
military action must be used more effectively in order to bring an end to al Qaeda and ISIS. 
By saying effectively, I do not suggest increasing the military’s role in countering terrorism 
by increased bombing of suspected terrorists, more military spending, or deploying more 
troops abroad to combat terrorists. On the contrary, in order to effectively bring an end to 
today’s religious terrorist organizations, I believe it is necessary for the United States and 
other western countries to restrict their use of the military to combat terrorism, and allow 
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for nonmilitary measures to play a larger role. The use of military force by the United States 
and other Western countries has failed for many reasons, but this is not uncommon 
because only 7% of the time states rely on the military to end a terrorist campaign are they 
successful. Military use for counterterrorism can also have an adverse effect and lead to 
terrorist organizations gaining more members. The military’s role in counterterrorism 
must be reduced and a greater focus placed on more preventative measures that block 
terrorist organizations from launching attacks and gaining territory in order to protect 
potential victims therefore discrediting the legitimacy of the organization.  
  After 9/11, al Qaeda succeeded in gaining more support for their cause because of 
the United States use of military force and its invasion of both Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
United States invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq was done as a part of the U.S. War on 
Terrorism, which vaguely declared that the United States would fight until all terrorist 
groups wishing to attack the United States and its allies were eliminated. In 2001, after the 
9/11 attacks, Congress passed a bill, the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against 
Terrorists (AUMF) which gave the President the power “to engage those ‘nations, 
organizations, and persons’ responsible for the 2001 attacks both as a means of retaliation 
and to allow preventive action”79. The deployment of U.S. troops to combat al Qaeda in the 
War on Terror and the passing of the AUMF in 2001 would be the beginning of the United 
States’ militarization of counterterrorism, which still exists today.  
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Before the 9/11 attack occurred, bin Laden had made videotapes and explained to 
reporters that he wanted to draw a U.S. military presence into the Middle East in order to 
combat U.S. troops stationed there80. One major reason why al Qaeda wanted this was 
because they believed it would spur widespread recruitment because much of Islamic 
world had already viewed the United States as an aggressive country and as an enemy to 
Islam. Osama bin Laden’s bodyguard alluded to this idea before the 9/11 attacks and is 
quoted as saying, “ We are working for a big operation: namely, dragging the United States 
into a confrontation with the entire Islamic world”81. By deploying hundreds of thousands 
of troops to Afghanistan, and shortly after Iraq, the United States provided proof for the al 
Qaeda organization to spread to its audience, most importantly potential recruits, that the 
United States was waging war against Islam and that a defensive jihad was necessary to 
defend Islam. Bruce Hoffman writes about the effect that the United States foreign policy 
actions had on countries with large Muslim populations in the aftermath 9/11 and their 
views towards bin Laden: 
“Bin Laden’s astonishingly popularity among the populations of such key 
American allies in the war on terrorism as Pakistan (where in 2004 he was 
viewed favorably by 65 percent of those polled), in Jordan (55 percent), and 
in Morocco (45%) attests to the intense antipathy felt toward the United 
States in North Africa, the Middle East, and South and South East Asia, as well 
as in other regions with large Muslim populations. This perception of Islam 
under attack by an incontestably predatory, aggressive U.S dominated West 
is of course eagerly exploited and expertly manipulated by bin Laden and his 
minions”82. 
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The United States War on Terrorism may have been unsuccessful for a variety of 
reasons, but it is hard ignore one reason in particular and that is it gave al Qaeda the 
propaganda and thus the ability to recruit thousands of new members to fight against the 
U.S. The United States military may have successfully diminished al Qaeda’s strength, 
influence, and operational capabilities, but despite that the group still exists and launches 
attacks today because it was able to recruit new members over the past 16 years.  
After President Bush’s two terms, his successor, President Obama, declared an end 
to the War on Terrorism, however, he still utilized many of the same military tactics 
President Bush had use to combat terrorism.  During President Obama’s presidency, he 
shifted counterterrorism policy slightly from President Bush’s by pulling back military use 
and placing more importance on preventing terrorist groups from attracting new members. 
However, despite President Obama including more non-military actions to battle terrorism, 
the U.S. military still played a major role in counterterrorism during his presidency. While 
Obama was President, he kept U.S. troops in Afghanistan and increased military spending 
such as  “U.S Special Operations Command from $9bn in 2010 to $9.8bn in 2011-and 
assistance to foreign militaries, raised from $350m in 2010 to $400m in 2011”83. Despite 
President Obama claiming to end to the War on Terrorism, he still used the military under 
the AUMF to combat terrorism, which may as well have been a continuation of the War on 
Terror84. Despite the Obama administration not ending the War on Terrorism due to the 
President’s use of the AUMF, he did reduce military involvement. United States 
counterterrorism policy makers should continue to deescalate the military’s role to combat 
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terrorism and focus on preventing the radicalization of people who continue to join al 
Qaeda and ISIS.  
That does not mean that the United States should completely abandon military use 
in counterterrorism. Geraint Hughes writes about how western states should shape their 
counterterrorism policies and use military force: 
 “Physical elimination or incarceration of terrorists is a secondary task to 
wider nonmilitary measures to reduce the appeal of terrorism, notably the 
need to work with foreign governments, civil society groups and NGOs to 
address socioeconomic and political problems which may radicalize potential 
recruits for al-Qaeda. It is also advisable following the Iraq debacle to keep 
direct military intervention by Western states to an absolute 
minimum…specific military measures can be applied if they are related to a 
wider process of political engagement with regional powers, and also aspects 
of soft power such as public diplomacy”85.  
 
One successful use of the military against terrorist organizations is its ability to 
launch preemptive intervention strikes against a terrorist organization before it launches 
an attack. During the 1990s in Ireland, the British military adopted a strategy of prevention 
and focused its resources and men on preventing the IRA from launching attacks. This 
proved to be successful in not only preventing the attack but because it had a demoralizing 
effect on the IRA. These preventative strikes by the British against IRA members who were 
about to commit a terrorist attack were successful because they not only made the IRA 
unable to launch attacks but ultimately led to the killing or capture of many members. The 
inability of the IRA to attack led to frustration within the group and resulted in failing 
recruitment and lack of propaganda so the population of Irish Republicans turned to 
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“nonviolent methods to pursue their goals” as violence became more apparently 
unsuccessful to them86.  
Since 9/11, military force has been the focus of U.S. counterterrorism policies. The 
U.S. has held the belief that the most successful way to combat modern terrorists is to go 
overseas and root out terrorists and kill them in order to deplete the group’s membership 
and deter others from joining evidenced by President Bush stating, “Those who make war 
with the United States have chosen their own destruction”87. In President Bush’s statement 
he declares that any person who joins a terrorist group, such as al Qaeda, will be destroyed 
in order to deter members and with the military using aggressive means to kill as many 
terrorists as possible, this should be a sign to any person thinking of joining al Qaeda. 
Deterrence through military means has been unsuccessful but despite that, this method has 
been continuing for over a decade and has been very costly for the U.S, and as mentioned 
above, has also spurred further membership for terrorist groups. What the U.S should do is 
vastly reduce its military action in its counterterrorism efforts and focus more on 
nonviolent practices that aim to prevent recruitment.  Due to the differences in al Qaeda 
and ISIS, I propose two separate approaches that the military should take to combat them. 
The U.S. military should focus on preventing al Qaeda from launching attacks against the 
West and stop ISIS from gaining new territory.  
Al Qaeda cannot be fought militarily because “al Qaeda is ineradicable because it can 
survive, cockroach-like, by going underground”88, which makes it difficult for conventional 
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militaries to target al Qaeda members and bases. Due to the United States inability to use 
the military to eradicate al Qaeda, the U.S should focus on preventing al Qaeda from 
launching attacks against the U.S. The U.S is the primary enemy to al Qaeda due to many 
Muslims disliking U.S foreign policy in the Middle East, so any military action the U.S takes 
to combat al Qaeda can be characterized as not just an attack on al Qaeda but as an attack 
on Islam. However, if al Qaeda was unable launch attacks many of its recruits may be 
persuaded to resort to different tactics to achieve their political aspirations. Geraint Hughes 
writes, “military and police operations can be integrated as part of an overall policy of 
containing and, if necessary, neutralizing hard-core terrorists who wish to fight to the 
bitter end, while impressing those amenable to compromise that negotiations offer a more 
viable means of achieving objectives than the continuation of violence”89. If the U.S. 
restricted al Qaeda’s ability to attack, many members or recruits may view al Qaeda as 
unable to succeed in causing any change, and they may turn to more political strategies of 
recruiting which is very similar to the British forces thwarting IRA attacks during the 
1990’s. John M. Venhaus writes about how the U.S should take a two-step approach with 
nonviolent and military counterterrorism measures writing: 
“Since defeating al-Qaeda does not involve fighting in a particular physical 
place, the central tenet of the radicalization prevention strategy is to 
discredit the brand image and dissuade those who seek membership or 
affiliation. Physical confrontation should continue, because discrediting the 
brand requires that al-Qaeda operations be continuously and publicly 
destroyed, dismantled, and disrupted with an active combination of military 
and law enforcement actions. Concurrently, a parallel effort should plant 
doubts about the viability and effectiveness of al-Qaeda operations in the 
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minds of those who seek to join al-Qaeda or establish an associated 
movement”90.  
In order to do this, the U.S. should take a more domestic approach in preventing al 
Qaeda from launching attacks and only resort to launching military attacks in the Middle 
East if it is in order to prevent an attack from occurring because by doing so it will discredit 
al Qaeda and diminish al Qaeda’s recruitment capabilities.  
ISIS’s goal is to establish a caliphate, and if it were unable to grab more land and 
especially if it started to lose land that it controlled, it would lose a lot of its credibility and 
inflict a blow to the organization’s ability to recruit new members to continue to fight to 
establish a caliphate. The U.S. could use more conventional military tactics against ISIS 
because it functions more as a state than a terrorist group as does al Qaeda. However, a U.S. 
“invasion would be a huge propaganda victory for jihadists worldwide”91. If the U.S. 
invaded, ISIS could rally many recruits to join because the U.S. is launching a War on Islam 
much like al Qaeda did during the U.S invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. With ISIS more 
focused on regional struggles, it launches fewer attacks against western countries so U.S. 
counterterrorism strategy against ISIS should be focused on supporting ISIS’s enemies. 
Supporting the Kurds with supplies, training, money, intelligence, and air support would be 
in the U.S. best interest militarily because “they can keep the Islamic State from fulfilling its 
duty to expand. And with every month that it fails to expand, it resembles less the 
conquering state of the Prophet Muhammad than yet another Middle Eastern government 
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failing to bring prosperity to its people”92.  The U.S. should use military action against al 
Qaeda only to support the enemies of ISIS in order to delegitimize the group’s goal of 
developing a caliphate because ISIS success thus far in controlling territory has led to 
members pouring in from all over the world.  
U.S. counterterrorism strategy should not define U.S. military action as the sole 
method in combating terrorism, because as time has proven it is ineffective and in many 
cases has negative consequences for the state. Counterterrorism policies should focus more 
on nonviolent methods that disrupt terrorist recruitment, and only use military force to 
prevent attacks in order to save lives and destroy the group’s credibility and thus 
recruitment ability. The aim in counterterrorism should not be founded on the idea to 
eliminate these groups by force because militaries only have about a 7% percent success 
rate in ending terrorist organizations93. The U.S. should repeal the AUMF because it is only 
a continuation of the War on Terror,94 and instead implement counterterrorism military 
policies that aim to discredit the terrorist group. By preventing al Qaeda from launching 
attacks against the West, and ISIS from grabbing more territory, they appear illegitimate to 
their potential recruits because they will seem to be weak organizations unable to achieve 
their aspirations. The U.S. should then focus on nonviolent strategies, which aim to prevent 
al Qaeda and ISIS from gaining more members, which I will describe later in this chapter. 
The idea of demilitarization in counterterrorism is very similar to the British 
counterterrorism approach towards the IRA during the 1990’s, which promoted more Irish 
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Catholic political involvement in Northern Ireland and the use of the military to prevent 
IRA attacks from occurring, both of which made joining the IRA much less appealing.  
 
 
Nonviolent Counterterrorism 
Government Suppression an Issue 
 One way in which states can combat today’s religious terrorist groups is for states to 
support many of the governmental and political changes occurring in the Middle East. 
Throughout the Middle East there has been a major push by younger generations wanting 
more democratic institutions like free elections, freedom of the press, equality, and more 
democratic governments, which is very damaging to groups like al Qaeda and ISIS. “When 
dictators reigned supreme in Arab lands, al-Qaeda could score points by emphasizing the 
struggle against despotism… When dictators such as Mubarak fall, however, al-Qaeda loses 
one of its best recruiting pitches: the repression of Arab governments inflict on their 
citizens”95. ISIS and al Qaeda have been able to take advantage of political turmoil 
throughout the Middle East and add thousands of members to their ranks because of their 
political disfranchisement. As previously referenced, Sunnis in Syria have been at odds with 
the Assad regime and joining ISIS has been a popular way for many Sunnis in Syria to fight 
back. Many Sunnis join because they feel that living under the rule of a caliph is a much 
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better option than under the harsh Syrian government, which, routinely represses, 
economically disfranchises, and kills innocent Sunnis. Sunnis in Iraq have also joined both 
al Qaeda and ISIS for similar reasons, despite the Iraqi government not being as repressive 
towards them as the Assad regime in Syria. As Sunnis in Iraq have experienced a power 
shift since the end of Saddam Hussein’s reign, with power transferring from them to the 
Shia majority, they have felt and have experienced political disfranchisement.  
 Much like today’s religious terrorists groups, one can also see the same issue 
operating in Northern Ireland during the late 1900s, which sparked the Troubles and 
further IRA recruitment. One of the main reasons the IRA lasted so long as a terrorist 
organization is because so many Irish Catholics felt neglected by Irish Protestants and 
England, that they saw no other way to gain equality but to resist by the use of force. For 
good reason, Sunnis in Iraq and Syria, as well as Irish Catholics in the 1900’s, felt repressed 
by their governments. Both al Qaeda and ISIS have vowed that they will fight democracies 
as hard as they fight dictatorships, however, this may not be possible because with 
democracy the idea of fighting a democratic government may be much less inviting to the 
Arab world96. With more democratic governments and policies in states such as Syria and 
Iraq that promote equality, fewer individuals would be inclined to pick up arms and fight 
for a terrorist groups because political and social issues that they currently face will more 
likely be resolved creating fewer reasons as to why a person would join a terrorist group.  
 If the United States, other western countries, and countries in the Middle East 
strengthened their engagement with Sunni Muslims in Iraq and Syria, they could possibly 
help prevent and reverse the current disfranchisement in both Sunni communities. If many 
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of the grievances that Sunni Muslims have in both states were heard and addressed it 
would decrease the sectarian divide that currently exists in both states, inflicting a massive 
blow to much of al Qaeda’s and ISIS’S recruitment. Propaganda made by both al Qaeda and 
ISIS that is aimed to recruit Sunni Muslims by drawing on sectarian issues would be less 
effective because the issues Sunni Muslims faced in both countries may be effectively 
diminished with a more democratic government and policies that develop equality for 
them as well.   
 
Preventing Homegrown Terrorists 
Western states such as the U.S. can also develop more political and social policies to 
prevent individuals from becoming radicalized within their own states. A European study 
of individuals who have committed a terrorist attack in Europe, found that long-term 
citizens of the state that felt alienated and discriminated in their society were much more 
likely to commit a terrorist attack97.  In the U.S., along with many other Western countries, 
Muslims have been treated as second-class citizens; many being immigrants and others 
being treated poorly even after having lived in the country for 2 or 3 generations. They do 
not achieve economically because they do not have the same opportunities as their 
counterparts in society. Individuals can be much more susceptible to radicalization because 
of the division between them and the society that they live in. Some become inspired to join 
these groups or carryout a lone wolf attack in the name of the group.  
In order to combat this, states should adopt policies preventing discrimination 
against Muslims and other minorities, and create programs that help those that lack many 
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of the opportunities available to the majority of society, such as education and healthcare. 
In Europe especially, many states have already passed legislation aimed at protecting 
human rights, which may be infringed upon during counterterrorism measures, in order to 
prevent alienating Muslims in society and also create programs in order to assist poor 
Muslim communities. The United States has failed to adopt many of these same tactics, 
which has only helped fuel the radicalization of many individuals. The European Counter 
Terrorism Coordinator, Gijs de Vries states: 
“To win the battle for hearts and mind our policies to combat terrorism must 
respect the rights and value we have pledged to defend including the rights 
of prisoners. Abu Grahib, Guantanamo and CIA renditions have damaged 
America’s standing in the world and have compromised our common 
struggle against terrorism. Credibility matters. The European Union 
continues to believe that in this battle we should be guided by established  
international legal standards, including international human rights law”98.    
 
 If the United States were to adopt many of these tactics to prevent discrimination 
such as wrongful imprisonment, torture, and restrictions on religious freedoms, it could 
strike a significant blow to ISIS and al Qaeda’s recruiting and the danger states face from 
citizens within their own population becoming a members of either terrorist organization 
or any other for that matter. One step that the U.S. could take in order to start to prevent 
the discrimination of Muslims is by closing Guantanamo Bay. The harsh prison conditions 
and the wrongful imprisonment of many Muslims in Guantanamo Bay has been used as a 
recruiting tool for al Qaeda and ISIS.  They use this to enforce the idea that the U.S. is an 
oppressive government toward all Muslims. By shutting down the prison the United States 
could take the first step towards building policies that prevent the discrimination of 
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Muslims. More must be done after that in order to defend Muslim individuals equal rights. 
After the shutdown of Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. should look to develop laws to protect the 
Muslim population within the country, as have many European countries. If Muslims have 
the same rights as other non-Muslims, then they would not feel as discriminated against by 
the U.S. government. Muslims in the U.S would unlikely be as receptive to ISIS or al Qaeda’s 
message that the U.S is waging a war on Islam if they were treated as any other citizen by 
the United States and had the same rights as any other American citizen. 
 Another issue that must be dealt in Western countries, especially in the U.S, is the 
treatment of Muslims by Western societies. The way in which Western societies treat and 
talk about Muslims is a systemic issue that has led to the radicalization of many Muslims. If 
Western societies continue to use language that discriminates against Muslims or Islam, 
they may cause Muslims to become alienated and more likely to join a terrorist 
organization. It is important that Western societies change their language when referring 
to Islam and Muslims especially when referring to terrorism because as of now there is a 
lot of anti-Muslim sentiment throughout Western populations. In the United States many 
prominent figures have painted Islam as a religion of hate and intolerance, and that the 
religion of Islam is directly responsible for why Islamic terrorist groups exist. For example, 
many Christian religious leaders are very influential because they have such large 
followings and in many cases have spread their intolerant views about Islam to the 
American public. An anonymous CIA officer wrote examples of what many American 
religious leaders were saying about Islam writing:  
“Pat Robertson says, ‘Adolf Hitler is bad, but what the Muslims do to Jews is 
worse; the Reverend Jerry Falwell refers to the Prophet as a ‘terrorist’; Jimmy 
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Swaggart prays that ‘God blesses those who bless Israel and damn those that 
damn it”; and the Reverend Franklin Graham calls Islam a ‘wicked religion’”99 
  
The American government cannot change society’s beliefs, treatment, or sentiments 
concerning Islam or Muslims which makes it much more difficult to solve this issue. Also, 
given that many individuals who carry intolerant views towards Islam have platforms that 
allow them to spread their beliefs to thousands or even millions of Americans, makes it 
even more difficult to reverse anti-Islamic sentiment. The U.S. government cannot silence 
these individuals or those that hold intolerant views towards Muslims, but it can attempt to 
try and shape American public opinion away from anti-Islamic rhetoric. If American society 
is to become more tolerant of Muslims, prominent figures must begin speak about Islam 
using different language as not to demonize the entire religion and its followers. A clear 
distinction must be made between the very small percentage of Muslims that use Islam as a 
reasoning to wage a terrorist campaign, and the overwhelming majority of peaceful 
Muslims. If U.S. society were to become more accepting of Muslims, then Muslim 
individuals would feel less alienated and thus unlikely to join a terrorist organization. The 
ability to change anti Islamic views of American society may be extremely difficult and also 
impossible because no piece of legislation can shape American perception making this a 
very difficult issue to fix. However a campaign should be launched in order to shape 
American minds in order to prevent Muslims from becoming radicalized because they feel 
as though they do not belong in American society and begin to view the U.S and the West as 
their adversary.  
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Countering Social Media 
 ISIS and al Qaeda have been able to rely on social media for recruitment because it 
has provided them an outlet to spread their brand to attract new members. The use of 
social media has been very advantageous to both groups and other modern terrorist 
groups not just because of the recruitment capabilities it provides, but also because no 
state has found a way that effectively prevents recruitment through social media. Social 
media is a new phenomenon in human history and has opened up a new frontier in 
terrorism that counterterrorism institutions are unable to deal with and as of now.  
Before social media, terrorist organizations were dependent on the mainstream 
media to reach potential recruits, and would do so by launching attacks because the 
media’s coverage of their attack would provide the organization a platform for them to 
promote their organization. The dependence on the mainstream media restricted the 
ability of older terrorist groups to recruit because if a media outlet chose to cover other 
current events, their message would go unheard. Social media has made this a non issue 
though by cutting out the media as a necessary middle man because now terrorists can 
directly communicate with a large audience through social media and promote their 
brand100. ISIS and al Qaeda can spread their propaganda, ideology, and narratives of their 
attacks through social media to a broader audience and gain recruits because of the 
freedom social media gives them to do so, and thus far no state has developed a truly 
successful method to combat today’s terrorist organizations online101.  
Why it’s Difficult 
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 One reason the U.S. or any other state has been unable to stop terrorist’s use of 
social media is because of states’ governments inabilities to control the Internet as a whole. 
Gabrielle Wiemann writes about how terrorist recruitment and activities are suited for the 
Internet writing,” … it is de-centralized, it cannot be subject to control or restriction, it is 
not censored, and it allows access to anyone who wants it”102. Weimann’s description 
makes it seem as though the Internet is under no governmental control, which is not true. 
However, it does describe how many governments allow for the Internet to remain largely 
independent from the government’s control, which gives terrorist groups the opportunity 
to operate in a more de-centralized space. The Internet creates a safe space because it 
allows terrorists to communicate more anonymously and out of reach of state 
authorities103. In countries that have more Internet censorship, such as North Korea, these 
safe spaces will be much less likely to exist, but countries such as the United States and 
other Western nations which allow more freedom on the internet due to less censorship 
allow for opportunities for terrorists to operate online without state interference. It may 
seem simple to just say the U.S. government should resort to more censorship of the 
Internet to prevent terrorist’s recruitment, but if the U.S. government were to do so it 
would restrict the freedom Americans have concerning the Internet. For example, due to 
ISIS and al Qaeda using popular social media websites such as Facebook and Twitter to 
communicate, the U.S. government would have to censor both websites to prevent terrorist 
communication and would result in all Americans losing access to then as well. The same 
would go for any website which the U.S. government believes terrorists use to recruit 
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online. Censorship of the Internet to prevent terrorists groups from communicating 
through social media would be successful in preventing terrorist groups from recruiting, 
but it would be costly because American citizens would lose freedom on the Internet and 
would be a violation of the First Amendment. Censorship is not a dependable strategy 
because legally the U.S government cannot do it and because of the effect censorship would 
have on the American people.   
The inability to censor the Internet allows terrorist groups to use social media 
platforms and have a larger audience, but why can’t the U.S. control social media sites and 
restrict terrorist’s group’s use on social media? The U.S. and other state governments 
cannot control social media sites because of the high of volume of use by terrorists. The U.S. 
can’t simply delete, block, and remove terrorists groups on social media sites because the 
shut down of all terrorists organizations on social media would be an impossible task 
because of the sheer amount of social media accounts and websites that already exist, and 
the fact that terrorist groups can promptly create new accounts and websites if one is 
deleted104. Due to the lack of control of the Internet, is had become impossible for the U.S. 
or other governments to stop terrorists from using social media to recruit because it would 
entail violating the right of others to freely use the internet and its impossible to regulate 
social media accounts and prevent the access from specifically terrorist groups.  
Current Methods 
Due to the inability for state governments to control the social media use of 
terrorists, the U.S. State Department has become more active throughout social media itself 
in order to combat terrorist online recruiting. The Center for Strategic Counterterrorism 
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Communications (CSCC) has created a Facebook account, three Twitter accounts, and a 
YouTube account in Arabic only in order spread messages that counter terrorist social 
media groups, such as those created by ISIS and al Qaeda, in order to prevent the 
radicalization of individuals105. Many of the groups created by the Digital Outreach 
Program have thousands of followers, but many followers may be those who already 
shared the same views the group promotes, or be researchers studying the activity of the 
group so many actual followers may not be the targeted audience. The unknown reasoning 
as to why people are following the groups makes “The counter-messaging strategy difficult 
to evaluate, as metrics of views and followers do not equate to proof that people are 
deterred from being extremists”106. Counter-messaging by states can also use material 
posted on the social media sites of terrorists and use it as a propaganda tool against them 
as James Farwell describes, “ISIS fighters may take pride in tweeting and bragging about 
their experiences, but such material provides fodder for the group’s opponents, who can 
use it to discredit the militants’ narrative while mobilizing opposition”107. The extremely 
violent images can be used as propaganda to discredit and convince possible recruits that 
joining the terrorist group is not in their best interest. However, there is also proof that 
these violent images may be popular among many and that reposting these pictures may 
even help the terrorist group that originally posted it. Kathleen Bouzis writes about the 
effects a violent video posted by the Digital Outreach Program: 
“To a troubled, youthful, predominantly male audience this message might 
elevate ISIL in their eyes as a force that dominates its enemies and shows no 
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mercy toward its adversaries and therefore this video could be 
counterproductive and might function as pro-ISIL propaganda”108.  
Due to social media being so new and its quick implementation by terrorist groups 
for recruitment and other purposes, states’ counterterrorism measures have not been an 
adequate solution to stop them from recruiting members online. States are limited in their 
ability to prevent terrorist groups from using social media because they cannot use 
censorship as it would be costly for their own citizens, and as of now there is no proven 
method that successfully deters recruits from becoming radicalized and joining terrorist 
groups like al Qaeda and ISIS. The U.S. is actively using counter-messaging to deter terrorist 
membership, but it is not known if it has had an impact. The U.S. should continue to 
develop the Digital Outreach Program and find a way to determine if it is having a positive 
outcome. 
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Conclusion  
The purpose of this paper is to explain how existing, religiously inspired terrorist 
groups are more likely to have greater longevity than secular terrorist groups because of 
their different recruitment methods. Certain terrorist groups have unique recruitment 
strategies due to their religiosity, which helps them appeal to more people and inspire 
more individuals to join their organizations. In this paper, I have written case studies about 
three terrorist groups, the IRA, al Qaeda, and ISIS, and have highlighted the key themes that 
have contributed to each groups’ successful recruitment of new members, and how their 
continued recruitment is possible leading to each group extending their longevity. 
Religious terrorist groups are different than secular terrorist organizations because 
they can recruit new members by using religious ideology. Religious terrorist groups, as 
with all other terrorist groups, are formed to cause a political change, but religious terrorist 
groups can tie their political and religious ideologies together and in doing so use a variety 
of new methods to gain members. Religious terrorist groups can use sectarian issues 
revolving around religion to gain members, utilize religious symbols that are meant to 
certify the group’s ideology and draw in recruits, and describe their causes as divine and 
moral because they can project their enemy as being adversarial toward not only the 
group, but anyone who follows the same religion. Religion has proved to play a crucial 
motivating role for recruits, and terrorist groups have taken advantage of this. With 
religious terrorist groups’ combination of political and religious aspirations, they can 
attract more recruits because people are drawn in for greater reasons than they would be 
in terms of secular groups. The number of religious terrorist groups and total number of 
individuals involved in these groups are expected to decrease around the year 2025 
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because, historically, previous terrorist groups have been popular for approximately one 
generation because they cannot support recruitment cross generationally109. Due to 
current religious terrorist groups new recruitment abilities they seem able to survive for 
much longer because religion adds a host of advantages regarding recruiting.  
Given that religious terrorist groups may survive for much longer than other 
terrorist groups, it is important for states to develop counterterrorism policies focused on 
damaging the recruitment abilities of terrorist organizations. A key factor to combat 
today’s terrorist organizations is that counterterrorism policy makers in the United States 
should not expect the War on Terror to end abruptly, but change the military’s role in 
counterterrorism. The U.S. militarization of counterterrorism since the declaration of the 
War on Terror in 2001, has had no success for a variety of reasons. Most conventional 
military forces cannot effectively combat terrorists. The United States use of physical force 
cannot force terrorist groups into submission, and because the U.S. regards itself at war 
with terrorist organizations, it leads to the narrowing of counterterrorism policies and only 
focuses on the military aspect of combating terrorism110. States should not rely solely on 
military means for counterterrorism because they are ineffective for the most part. They do 
not prevent terrorist organizations from continuing to recruit and can often lead to 
terrorist organizations gaining even more support and recruits because a state’s 
militarized counterterrorism strategy may being characterized by terrorist groups as 
aggressive, unnecessary, and as targeting the religious identity the group claims to have. If 
the U.S. would repeal the AUMF, it would be a major step in the demilitarization of 
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counterterrorism and would allow for new counterterrorism methods outside of the 
military to operate likely causing more significant damage to the recruitment of today’s 
religious terrorist organizations, and in doing so, shorten the longevity of each 
organization.  
Going forward it will be interesting to see what approach President Trump takes 
toward religious terrorists groups. President Trump has not been in office long enough to 
determine exactly what type of counterterrorism methods he will employ against al Qaeda, 
ISIS and other terrorist organizations. Despite the lack of clarity surrounding the Trump 
administration’s policies towards counterterrorism, there can inferences made based on 
the limited actions he has taken thus far in office, and by the policies he suggested 
implementing throughout his campaign. It seems as though President Trump is more 
concerned with preventing terrorist attacks from being launched within the United States 
than directly combatting terrorism overseas. This is similar to the approach taken by 
President Obama. 
President Trump has taken a more domestic counterterrorism approach because of 
his idea that ISIS and al Qaeda will send their members directly to the U.S. in order to 
launch a coordinated attack. His solution to prevent these terrorist groups from launching 
terrorist attacks in the United States is to change the United States’ immigration policies 
concerning people travelling to the U.S. from countries that are predominantly Muslim. 
During a speech in August 2017, during the presidential campaign, President Trump gave a 
speech about fighting terrorism and stated, “Pew polling shows that in many of the 
countries from which we draw large numbers of immigrants, extreme views about religion 
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– such as the death penalty for those who leave the faith – are commonplace”111. President 
Trump’s belief that extremist groups are sending members to immigrate to America has 
resulted in him signing two executive orders preventing citizens and refugees from several 
Muslim majority countries from coming to the U.S. Judges have blocked both of these 
executive orders because they were ruled to be unconstitutional. Despite both executive 
orders not going into action, the Trump administration still seems focused on preventing 
domestic attacks from occurring, but nonetheless, these travel bans and other immigration 
policies that are aimed to prevent or make it much more difficult for terrorists to enter the 
United States may cause more issues as more Muslims may feel more alienated in the U.S. 
Also, his policies could deepen resentment toward the U.S. in the Middle East, only helping 
ISIS, al Qaeda, or other religious terrorists groups to recruit more members. 
Trump has also taken a similar approach to Obama with counterterrorism activity in 
the Middle East. Trump claims to have been in opposition of the Iraq war and has promised 
to abandon the idea of nation building. President Trump, like President Obama, wants to 
refrain from establishing large-scale U.S. personnel operations in the Middle East to fight 
terrorism and thus far has been relying on the AUMF to launch drone strikes, bombings, 
and the use of special operation units to fight ISIS and al Qaeda. President Trump has also 
called to rely more on NATO and other regional allies in the Middle East to prevent the 
spread of these religious terrorist groups112. The continuation of President Obama’s 
counterterrorism measures in the Middle East is a better solution than escalating the 
military force, but it will still remain unsuccessful in preventing ISIS and al Qaeda from 
recruiting more members.  
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Given President Trump’s actions thus far, and the counterterrorism policies he laid 
out during his campaign, do not seem suitable to effectively bring an end to either terrorist 
organization. Yet it is still very early in Trump’s presidency and many things can change 
regarding counterterrorism and the policies he and his administration make to fight al 
Qaeda and ISIS. If the Trump administration is to be successful in bringing an end to both 
groups, the U.S. should repeal the AUMF and resort to more nonviolent tactics. Nonviolent 
methods such as implementing diplomatic measures to develop equality of Sunni Muslims 
in Syria and Iraq, counter messaging Al Qaeda and ISIS’s religious claims, and the 
promoting the Muslim minority populations in Western countries to prevent them from 
being radicalized would all deal a significant blow to ISIS and al Qaeda and make it much 
more difficult for them to survive. If the U.S. enacted counterterrorism policies such as 
these and abandoned older counterterrorism models, recruitment would be increasingly 
difficult and lead to the downfall of many religious terrorist groups because without 
enough membership terrorist groups cannot survive and will cease to exist.  
 80 
Bibliography 
Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People: Hearings Before the American 
People, 2001 President (D.C. 2001) (statement of George W. Bush). Accessed May 1, 
2017. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-
8.html. 
  
Arena, Michael, and Bruce Arrigo. The Provisional Irish Republican Army. New York, NY: 
NYU Press, 2007. 
  
Badey, Thomas. "The ROle of Religion in International Terrorism." Sociological Focus 35, no. 1 
(February 2002): 81-86. 
http://www.jstor.org.ezprox.bard.edu/stable/20832152?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true
&searchText=what&searchText=inspired&searchText=religious&searchText=terrorism
&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3Dwhat%2Binspired%2Breligio
us%2Bterrorism%26amp%3Bacc%3Don%26amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff
%26amp%3Bgroup%3Dnone&seq=4#page_scan_tab_contents. 
  
BBC. BBC to BBC newsgroup, "Guide: Syria's Diverse Minorities," December 9, 2011. 
Accessed May 2, 2017. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-16108755. 
  
Beresford, David. Ten Men Dead: The Story of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strikes. New York, NY: 
The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1997. 
  
Bertram, Luke. "Terrorism, the Internet and the Social Media Advantage: Exploring how 
terrorist organizations exploit aspects of the internet, social media and how these same 
platforms could be used to counter-violent extremism." Journel of Deradicalization 7 
(Summer 2016): 225-52. Accessed May 2, 2017. 
http://journals.sfu.ca/jd/index.php/jd/article/view/63/58. 
  
Bin Laden, Osama. "Full text: bin Laden's 'letter to America.'" The Guardian (Londen, England), 
October 2002. Accessed April 25, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/24/theobserver. 
  
Black, Phil. Phil Black to CNN newsgroup, "'I was a believer': Face-to-face with ISIS inside an 
Iraqi prison," November 24, 2016. Accessed April 29, 2017. 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/22/middleeast/isis-secret-prison-interview/. 
  
Bosi, Lorenzo. "Explaining Pathways to Armed Activism in the Provisional Irish Republican 
Army, 1969—1972." Social Science History 36, no. 3 (October/November 2012): 347-
90. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/23258104?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=iri
sh&searchText=republican&searchText=army&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearc
h%3Facc%3Don%26amp%3BQuery%3Dirish%2Brepublican%2Barmy%26amp%3Bfc
%3Doff%26amp%3Bso%3Drel%26amp%3Bhp%3D25%26amp%3Bprq%3Dira%2Bu.s
%2Brelations%26amp%3Bwc%3Don&seq=24#page_scan_tab_contents. 
 81 
  
Bouzis, Kathleen. "Countering the Islamic State: U.S. Counterterrorism Measures." Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 38, no. 10 (October 2015): 885-97. 
http://eds.a.ebscohost.com.ezprox.bard.edu/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=a1af039a-6ace-
4403-8895-8a0bbce0ae2a%40sessionmgr103&vid=3&hid=4110. 
  
Bunzel, Cole. "From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State." Brookings 19 
(March 2015): 1-45. Accessed May 2, 2017. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/The-ideology-of-the-Islamic-State.pdf. 
  
Byman, Daniel. "Comparing Al Qaeda and ISIS: Different goals, different targets." 
Brookings.edu. Accessed April 29, 2015. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/The-ideology-of-the-Islamic-State.pdf. 
  
———. "Terrorism: Al-Qaeda and the Arab Spring." The Arab Awakening, 2011. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1280ww.13?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&
searchText=al&searchText=qaeda&searchText=recruitment&searchUri=%2Faction%2F
doBasicSearch%3Fhp%3D25%26amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff%26amp%
3Bprq%3Dreligious%2Bterrorism%2Brecruitment%26amp%3BQuery%3Dal%2Bqaeda
%2Brecruitment%26amp%3Bacc%3Don%26amp%3Bso%3Drel&seq=2#page_scan_tab
_contents. 
  
Cockburn, Patrick. The Rise of Islamic State: ISIS and the New Sunni Revolution. London, U.K: 
Verso, 2014. PDF. 
  
Damon, Arwa, and Gul Tuysuz. Arwa Damon and Gul Tuysuz to CNN newsgroup, "How she 
went from a schoolteacher to an ISIS member," October 6, 2014. Accessed April 29, 
2017. http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/06/world/meast/isis-female-fighter/. 
  
Dean, Geoff. "The dark side of social media : review of online terrorism." Pakistan Journal of 
Criminology 3, no. 3 (January 2012): 2-25. PDF. 
  
Duffin, Claire. "National Archives: Margaret Thatcher's letters to families of hunger strikers 
released." The Telegraph (London, England), January 3, 2014. Accessed April 23, 2017. 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/margaret-thatcher/10541015/National-
Archives-Margaret-Thatchers-letters-to-families-of-hunger-strikers-released.html. 
  
English, Richard. Armed Struggle. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003. 
  
Farwell, James. "The Media Strategy of ISIS." Survival 56, no. 6 (December/January 2014-
2015): 49-55. 
https://webmail.bard.edu/service/home/~/Farwell_MediaStrategyofISIS_60591.pdf?auth
=co&loc=en_US&id=11542&part=2.2. 
  
 82 
Fernandez, Alberto. "Here to stay and growing: Combating ISIS propaganda networks." U.S.-
Islamic World Forum Papers 2015, October 2015, 1-27. https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/IS-Propaganda_Web_English_v2.pdf. 
  
Flournoy, Michèle, and Richard Fontaine. "An Intensified Approach to Combatting the Islamic 
State." Blind Spot:America's Response to Radicalism in the Middle East, 2015, 177-87. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt19gfk32.19?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchTe
xt=isis&searchText=social&searchText=media&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearc
h%3Fgroup%3Dnone%26amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bacc%3Don%26amp%3BQuer
y%3Disis%2Bsocial%2Bmedia%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff&seq=3#page_scan_tab_contents. 
  
Fraser, T.G. Ireland in Conflict 1922-1988. London, England: Routledge, 2000. 
  
Geltzer, Joshua. US Counter-terrorism Strategy and Al-Qaeda: Signalling and the Terrorist 
World-View. New York, NY: Routledge, 2010. Accessed May 2, 2017. 
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=fnuMAgAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&d
q=us+counter+terrorism&ots=w8ZNS9x7M5&sig=SYiXolhlHDmkKEKqcJj-
PDl14ns#v=onepage&q=bodyguard&f=false. 
  
Hart, Peter. "The Social Structure of the Irish Republican Army, 1916-1923." The Historical 
Journal 42, no. 1 (March 1991): 207-31. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3020901?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=Iris
h&searchText=Republican&searchText=army&searchText=creation&searchUri=%2Fact
ion%2FdoBasicSearch%3Fso%3Drel%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff%26amp%3Bacc%3Don%2
6amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bprq%3DIrish%2BRepublican%2Barmy%26amp%3Bh
p%3D25%26amp%3BQuery%3DIrish%2BRepublican%2Barmy%2Bcreation&seq=13#
page_scan_tab_contents. 
  
Hayes, Bernadette, and Ian McAllister. "Sowing Dragon’s Teeth: Public Support for Political 
Violence and Paramilitarism in Northern Ireland." Sage Publishing 49, no. 1 (2001): 901-
22. Accessed April 23, 2017. http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/1467-
9248.00346. 
  
Hicks, Patrick. "One bloody Sunday: 35 years ago, British soldiers opened fire on Irish 
protesters: it's an old story, of many times, many places." National Catholic Reporter, 
January 26, 2007. 
http://go.galegroup.com/ps/retrieve.do?tabID=T003&resultListType=RESULT_LIST&se
archResultsType=SingleTab&searchType=BasicSearchForm&currentPosition=1&docId
=GALE%7CA159181754&docType=Cover+story&sort=Relevance&contentSegment=&
prodId=AONE&contentSet=GALE%7CA159181754&searchId=R5&userGroupName=n
ysl_se_bardcsl&inPS=true&authCount=1&u=nysl_se_bardcsl. 
  
Hoffman, Bruce. Inside Terrorism. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006. 
  
 83 
Hughes, Geraint. "The Military’s Role in Counterterrorism: Examples and Implications for 
Liberal Democracies." The Letort Papers. Accessed May 2, 2017. 
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB1066.pdf. 
  
Jones, Seth, and Martin Libicki. "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qa’ida." 
Rand Corporation, 2008, 1-223. 
  
Laden, Osama Bin. Osama Bin Laden to Frontline newsgroup, "Osama bin Laden V. The U.S: 
Edicts and Statements," March 11, 1997. Accessed April 30, 2017. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/edicts.html. 
  
———. Osama Bin Laden to NBC newsgroup, 1998. Accessed February 28, 2017. 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/4686034/ns/world_news-hunt_for_al_qaida/t/timeline-al-
qaida-statements/#.WQiwnukqKFK. 
  
Lipka, Michael. "The Sunni-Shia divide: Where they live, what they believe and how they view 
each other." PewResearcCenter. Last modified June 18, 2014. Accessed May 2, 2017. 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/18/the-sunni-shia-divide-where-they-live-
what-they-believe-and-how-they-view-each-other/. 
  
McCaffery, Lawrence. "Isaac Butt and the Home Rule Movement: A Study in Conservative 
Nationalism." The Review of Polotics 22, no. 1 (January 1960): 72-95. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1405267?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=ho
me&searchText=rule&searchText=movement&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch
%3Fgroup%3Dnone%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff%26amp%3BresultsServiceName%3DdoBac
kToBasicResults%26amp%3BQuery%3Dhome%2Brule%2Bmovement%26amp%3Bacc
%3Don%26amp%3Bwc%3Don&seq=7#page_scan_tab_contents. 
  
McIntosh, Chris. "Counterterrorism as War: Identifying the Dangers, Risks, and Opportunity 
Costs of U.S. Strategy Toward Al Qaeda and Its Affiliates." Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism, October 13, 2014. 
https://webmail.bard.edu/service/home/~/SCT%20Jan%202015%20Article%20PDF.pdf?
auth=co&loc=en_US&id=11687&part=2.2. 
  
McKay, Hollie. Hollie McKay to Fox News newsgroup, "Confessions of a Captured ISIS 
Fighter," July 18, 2016. Accessed April 29, 2017. 
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/07/18/confessions-captured-isis-fighter.html. 
  
Nuemann, Peter. "Victims, Perpetrators, Assets: The Narratives of Islamic State Defectors." The 
International Centre for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, 2015, 1-14. 
Accessed May 2, 2017. http://socialutveckling.goteborg.se/uploads/ICSR-Report-
Victims-Perpertrators-Assets-The-Narratives-of-Islamic-State-Defectors.pdf. 
  
O'Brien, Peter. "Terrorism." The Muslim Question in Europe, 2016, 199-204. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1kft8dx.9?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText
=ira&searchText=propoganda&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3FQuery%3D
 84 
ira%2Bpropoganda%26amp%3Bgroup%3Dnone%26amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bac
c%3Don%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff&seq=4#page_scan_tab_contents. 
  
Phillips, Brian. "Terrorist Group Cooperation and Longevity." International Studies Quarterly 
58 (2014): 336-47. Accessed May 1, 2017. https://0fc35707-a-62cb3a1a-s-
sites.googlegroups.com/site/brianjphillips/phillipsISQonlinefirst.pdf?attachauth=ANoY7
cr4bYVyM4LF0FnWGqC7pWjGl1ErpdnW14fNfdqoR34fEz9tSH49tt1XU5F2XLlmexv
2aNqnar7UPC6KHN5-
DcnLAet8aB2aM9M_HbWDKR2IcoxQHkKYtEy3ieZtb9jW1G_IlUB4LirdBIlLKGMV
ozMdwaiaG6plMGOjq7D2xivOQ7HHsrp4ua30u9RvMLOY82XOd-
kxLmsfI1ORaAd1NPvqw7pJ0JApB53rRQJMqLX55-_AYJo%3D&attredirects=1. 
  
Rapoport, David. Attacking Terrorism: Elements of Grand Strategy. The Four Waves of Modern 
Terrorism. Washington, D.C: Georgetown University Press, 2004. 
  
Shanahan, Timothy. Provisional Irish Republican Army and the Morality of Terrorism. 
Edinburg, U.K: Edinburg University Press, 2009. 
  
SHAYKH MUHAMMAD HISHAM KABBANI. "Jihad: A Misunderstood Concept." The 
Islamic Supreme Council of America. Last modified January 2009. Accessed April 25, 
2017. http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-rulings/5-jihad-a-
misunderstood-concept-from-islam.html?start=9. 
  
"Social Networking Popular Across Globe: rab Publics Most Likely to Express Political Views 
Online." PewResearch. Last modified December 12, 2012. Accessed May 2, 2017. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/12/12/social-networking-popular-across-globe/. 
  
Sosis, Richard, and Candace Alcorta. "Militants and Martyrs: Evolutionary Perspectives on 
Religion and Terrorism." Overcoming Hate Portal, 1-24. 
http://www.overcominghateportal.org/uploads/5/4/1/5/5415260/militants_and_martyrs.pd
f. 
  
Sweeney, George. "Irish Hunger Strikes and the Cult of Self-Sacrifice." Journel of 
Contemporary History 28, no. 3 (July 1993): 421-37. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/260640?Search=yes&resultItemClick=true&searchText=irish
&searchText=hunger&searchText=strikes&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasicSearch%3
Facc%3Don%26amp%3Bwc%3Don%26amp%3Bgroup%3Dnone%26amp%3BQuery%3
Dirish%2Bhunger%2Bstrikes%26amp%3Bfc%3Doff&seq=2#page_scan_tab_contents. 
  
Trump, Donald. "Full text: Donald Trump's speech on fighting terrorism." Politico. Last 
modified August 15, 2016. Accessed April 27, 2017. 
http://www.politico.com/story/2016/08/donald-trump-terrorism-speech-227025. 
  
Tucker, Patrick. Patrick Tucker to The Atlantic newsgroup, "Why Join ISIS? How Fighters 
Respond When You Ask Them," December 9, 2015. Accessed April 29, 2017. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/12/why-people-join-isis/419685/. 
 85 
  
Venhaus, John. "Why Youth Join al-Qaeda." United States Institute of Peace, May 2010, 2-18. 
Accessed May 2, 2017. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR236Venhaus.pdf. 
  
Weimann, Gabrielle. In Terror on the internet: the new arena, the new challenges. Washington, 
D.C: Institute of Peace Press, 2005. 
  
Wood, Graeme. "What ISIS Really Wants." The Atlantic, March 2015. Accessed May 2, 2017. 
http://picpimp.net/BestPosts/ISIS.pdf. 
  
Young, Joseph, and Laura Dugan. "Survival of the Fittest: Why Terrorist Groups Endure." 
Perspectives on Terrorism 8, no. 2 (2014). Accessed April 30, 2017. 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/334/html. 
  
Zelin, Aaron. "The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global Jihadist 
Movement." Washington Institute 20 (June 2014): 1-11. Accessed May 2, 2017. 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/ResearchNote_20_Zelin.pd
f. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
